

bulletin

The Conflict, Security
& Development Group

The security dilemma confronting the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was brought into sharp focus by the assassination of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) President Laurent Désiré Kabila on 16 January 2001.

Three of its 14 members, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, have been party to a 'defence pact' with the Kabila regime for the past 18 months – consistent with the provisions of Article 2, paragraph J of the SADC Declaration and Treaty signed in Windhoek in 1992.

All three of the so-called 'SADC allies' increased their troop presence in the Congo within hours of Kabila's death. This move was designed to pre-empt their adversaries, Rwanda and

Uganda, from exploiting the power vacuum. Yet there is every possibility that they will decide to increase further their military contribution to the defence arrangement, even though it has had a negligible impact on the ground.

Since August 1998, when the rapid and last minute deployment of troops from Luanda, Harare and Windhoek prevented the collapse of Kinshasa, military action has failed to influence politics in the country. The six contending states – the three SADC allies, the DRC itself, and Rwanda and Uganda – have remained locked in a strategic stalemate. In fact, neither of the opposing groups has been able to extend their dominance beyond the areas that came under their initial control.

But a further military response to the death of Kabila needs to be carefully thought through; rash decisions will undoubtedly worsen the situation. It is important to stress that what is at stake is not merely disputed political control of the Congo, but also the wider and still undefined regional balance of power. And if the SADC allies do decide to pursue the costly option of deploying additional military forces,

Inside this issue . . . Lucy Hannan examines the challenges facing the new administration in Somalia and Colonel Simon Diggins provides a first-hand account of a training course for Sierra Leonean military officers. Plus regular features: *Policy Brief*, *Timeline*, *Pointers* and *Update*.

then they will also be vulnerable (once again) to potential economic destabilisation at home. At present, Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos, Namibian President Sam Nujoma and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe have a hold on power that is fraught with uncertainty.

An alternative to war

Policymakers and practitioners need, therefore, to consider alternative approaches to the likely intensification of the Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean military presence in the DRC.

Instead of a rise in militarism, what is actually required is a regionally integrated political response through the currently moribund SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

Most leaders talk openly about the need for a regional approach to security and attest to the provisions of Article 4 of the SADC Treaty. In reality, though, they have tended to pursue individual agendas while paying lip service to the concept. Yet such an initiative could harmonise the foreign and defence policies of the 14-member SADC grouping and stabilise the quantity of *matériel* and manpower being devoted to the war effort. A cut in troop numbers and other security-sector appendages could, in theory, also lead to a fall in regional defence expenditure and, in turn, the establishment of adequately resourced security sectors.

Unsustainably high levels of military spending are directly impeding economic growth and development in the region. According to the UN's *Human Development Reports*, large sections of society in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are already experiencing alarming rates of impoverishment and drastically reduced life expectancy to little over 40 years.

Internal security in all countries of the SADC region is dependent on directing the meagre amount of available resources towards the

alleviation of endemic poverty. If this problem is not tackled in the short-to-medium term, then it is likely that there will be a further escalation of regional warfare that could draw in other forces. In the case of the DRC, some shadowy and irregular regional and international actors are already engaged. Middle Eastern businessmen and private security companies, for example, have been servicing the different sides. And former Eastern European military personnel and their hardware, including transport planes, ground-attack helicopters and fighter aircraft, have always been available for hire.

Incentives for reform

Pan-African motives were initially behind the involvement of the SADC allies in the Congo – Kabila had made a formal plea for military assistance to the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) prior to the intervention. But economic concerns subsequently became important considerations. As a result, it is difficult to offer incentives that will encourage individual countries or sub-group security arrangements to abandon their current security configurations and the controversial use and abuse of their security apparatus.

Zimbabwe, for example, has several business contracts tied to its involvement in the DRC. First Bank, Zimbabwe Defence Industries, Air Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Agency and the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority – the enterprising arm of the Ministry of Agriculture – are all important parastatals that have openly established themselves in the Congo. In addition, Angolan President dos Santos wishes to prevent the continued use of the DRC as a base for attacks by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) against his country.

The short-term benefit of a change in the security situation is the enhancement of

internal stability. In the longer term, greater regional security can be achieved through collective defence co-operation in managing conflicts. In the DRC, the other SADC members have refused to join Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. This has caused tensions between the region's hegemon, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, which is striving for major regional power status.

Even before the outbreak of war in the Congo, though, there were signs of divisions within SADC (mainly between South Africa and Zimbabwe). The organisation was divided over how it should make the transition from the Front Line States (FLS) security arrangement to the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. Deep personal and policy differences apparently emerged between former South African President Nelson Mandela and Zimbabwean President Mugabe over whether or not the security mechanism should be part of the SADC chairman's mandate, as was favoured by

Mandela. This ongoing issue has left the ISDSC implementation body, comprising senior foreign, defence, security and military officials, operating without a cohesive political focus.

Regional security co-operation is the most viable option for the SADC region and for Africa as a whole. This conclusion is endorsed by the failure of externally driven peacekeeping missions, notably the US débâcle in Somalia in the early 1990s, and the reluctance of the UN Security Council to allow for an increased deployment of troops in response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

It is unlikely that, under the new administration of US President George W. Bush, the Americans will be willing to deploy troops to Africa in the foreseeable future. And much the same is true of the Europeans, with the exception of the UK in Sierra Leone.

Despite the divisions and the varying interests of the leaders of West African nations, the regional security arrangements pioneered



Photo: Associated Press

Namibian President Sam Nujoma, Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos, Congolese interim President Joseph Kabila and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (left to right) pay their respects to Laurent Kabila at the People's Palace, Kinshasa, 23 January 2001.

by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – through its monitoring group, ECOMOG, in Liberia and Sierra Leone – remain a necessary step towards tackling growing insecurities.

Conclusion

The SADC region consists of a group of nations that have inherited or developed large armed forces. According to the 2000–2001 *Military Balance*, Angola has an estimated active force strength of 107,500, the DRC has an estimated active force strength of 55,900, South Africa has an active force strength of 63,389, and Zimbabwe has an estimated active force strength of 40,000 personnel. Unconfirmed reports, however, suggest that the figure for the DRC is closer to 200,000.

In the current climate, the actions of regional leaders ensure that a militaristic approach is likely to take precedence over political solutions. The way forward requires increased political dialogue between the warring factions and must be predicated on the needs of the affected Congolese people.

In their prosecution of the war, both sides have marginalised the internal national dialogue and reconciliation process, as set out under the August 1999 Lusaka Agreement. This process reawakened the political consciousness of indigenous people in the DRC. If a semblance of peace is to be secured, then this issue must be factored back into the equation.

Martin R. Rupiya, Executive Director
Centre for Defence Studies
University of Zimbabwe

time line

24 February 2001

Kosovo, Day of Truth Conference: New Dangers for Europe, London, UK

Speakers will include: Boris Radovic, Director of International Aid Yugoslavia, Belgrade; Titus Alexander, founder of Charter 99; Sir Alfred Sherman, former Foreign Policy Advisor to Margaret Thatcher; and Walter Rockler, former US Prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.

Contact Dave Roberts on +44 (0)1444 232 356 or by e-mail at dave@saxonbooks.co.uk

1 March 2001

Accountability of the Security Sector in Commonwealth Countries, London, UK

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3–31 March 2001

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Somali interim President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan has received significant diplomatic backing since his inauguration on 27 August 2000.

But there is now deep-rooted concern about how much support should be directed towards the new government. The administration has to 'prove itself', following 10 years of devastating civil war and competing claims of political hegemony among the numerous factions.

Yet this amounts to an almost impossible task in a country that has been virtually laid to waste by fighting, international disengagement and poverty. It is a real 'chicken-and-egg' scenario. Can the government accomplish any of its goals without international funding? And can it gain international funding before it successfully implements any of its policy objectives?

Little humanitarian assistance has been delivered to Somalia since the US and the United Nations (UN) withdrew their forces from the country in 1995. While Saudi Arabia, for example, is reported to have provided some 'goodwill' financial support after Abdiqassim visited the country in September, no state or organisation has donated anything of real substance. Instead, the government has had to depend almost entirely on backing from leading figures within the local business community.

Many Somali entrepreneurs used the lack of government restrictions to accumulate vast wealth through trade with Arab states. Although this crucial source of financial support – inclu-

ding remittances from the Arab World, Europe and North America – will have its limitations and will become politically uncomfortable, it has allowed the government to take steps to address critical security issues.

The security challenge

The security situation, especially in Mogadishu, is the biggest challenge facing the new government. During the Djibouti peace process of May–August 2000, the decision was taken to award the presidency to the *Hawiye*, which controlled the capital. Self-appointed clan representatives believed that this was the only way to re-establish peace and security in the city, following a decade of violence between competing *Hawiye* sub-groups. While the security environment has improved considerably over the past two years, businessmen and international humanitarian staff still rely on the protection of militias.

Abdiqassim made the demobilisation of thousands of militia members and their reintegration into society a key policy objective. In November 2000, the transitional government announced plans to demobilise as many as 75,000 militia by the end of 2003.

Since January 2001, militia members from Mogadishu have been confined to three designated camps in the capital. So far, however, they have been cantoned on a clan basis – with the exception of the Islamic court militias. As a result, the new government has been criticised for seeking to consolidate its support base, rather than dealing with militias allied to faction leaders and other clans. The head of the National Commission for Security, General Muhammad Nur Galal, countered these arguments by highlighting that this was a temporary measure designed to aid the early organisation of the demobilisation effort and that all militia would eventually be integrated into the new security force.



Somali interim President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan addresses a crowd in Mogadishu on 28 December 2000.

The interim government has to find a way of financing and arming the nascent security force. The local business community, which is tired of meeting large overhead costs for security, has apparently contributed some \$300,000 a month since September 2000 towards the creation of a security force for Mogadishu. But it is unclear how long this commitment can be sustained.

Dealing with faction leaders

How the government deals with the heads of the Mogadishu factions will be crucial to the security situation. Its legitimacy is not high enough to enforce the rule of law, and, although the influence of the faction leaders is much diminished – since they have failed to meet their promises to the local population over the past decade – they remain a major force in the city.

Abdiqassim's administration is already under some international pressure – notably from Ethiopia and Kenya – to co-opt the faction leaders. But this strategy is likely to be of limited appeal to the new President, who is experienced

in government and despises the 'warlords'. And some clan members, who abandoned the faction leaders in order to support the government, may be unhappy about such a deal.

However, Abdiqassim did meet with Hussein Aideed – son of the late self-proclaimed Somali leader, Mohammed Farah Aideed – in Libya, and he has shown willingness to continue talks in Mogadishu. In general, though, the new administration has not yet demonstrated a clear policy towards the faction leaders.

Somaliland and Puntland

Another important test of the new government will be how it deals with the respective leaders of the self-declared northwest state of Somaliland and the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland in the northeast of the country. The stability of these areas has meant that they have attracted aid and international support – especially Somaliland, which is led by former Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal – although not diplomatic recognition.

Both the Puntland and Somaliland administrations boycotted the peace process and condemned the outcome of the August 'elections' – essentially an allocation of positions among the attendees of the Djibouti conference. They rejected Abdiqassim's appointment as President, and they have emphasised that his past position as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior make him a 'stooge' of the ousted regime.

Abdiqassim has ruled out the use of force to reclaim these areas. Yet supporters of the autonomous regions maintain that this is still a possibility. The favoured strategy of dialogue is problematic, since the elected parliamentarians from Puntland and Somaliland are viewed as political opponents in Mogadishu. Given the conditions in which the government was set up there is significant potential for confrontation and deadlock. In the end, Abdiqassim will

probably try to deal with the leaders (Egal and Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf) directly and to listen to any constructive comments from their regional representatives.

The regional dimension

Ethiopia will most likely constitute the key external challenge to the Abdiqassim administration. Although Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi attended the President's inauguration ceremony in August, the country has since backtracked on gestures of diplomatic recognition. And reports that Ethiopia – which is concerned about the presence of Islamic militants – has been arming and hosting opposing faction leaders have resulted in a rapid deterioration of relations. The Somali government put on an unsuccessful show of force in December 2000 to prevent weapons – allegedly from Ethiopia – from arriving in Mogadishu. Abdiqassim has accused Addis Ababa of interfering in Somalia's internal affairs and of stationing troops on its territory.

Tensions between these two old rivals add another dimension to the protracted conflict and drought crisis in the Horn of Africa. Political developments involving Ethiopia and Somalia have direct humanitarian implications for migration, displacement, economics and regional stability. For example, some of the largest refugee movements in recent history occurred after the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1970s, the collapse of the Somali state in the 1990s, and the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998.

Conclusion

The new government will struggle to deal with neighbouring states and international organisations that have grown used to a country where there have been no diplomatic or international ramifications for interference. During some 10 years of fragmentation and civil war, Somalia

became a fertile arena for proxy war and regional manipulation. Neighbouring countries and regional brokers backed different faction leaders, supplying them with money, guns, and, in some cases, military support.

Abdiqassim is keen to secure the backing of Libya, for example, in order to curb the flow of money and weapons to opposing faction leaders. But the development of stronger ties with the Arab World is likely to heighten concern in the West, especially in the US. Abdiqassim, who is a fluent Arabic speaker and lived in Cairo between 1991–93, came under immediate criticism for being too closely associated with 'Islamic fundamentalism'.

Some critics contend that the new government is a 'Djibouti creation' and that it will be controlled by a 'Djibouti agenda'. While it was generally recognised that Somalia itself was not in a position to host an effective peace process, there was always a danger that, if it were held outside the country, an external party would take control. Those who promoted the move stress that Djibouti provided Somalis with a unique cultural and political opportunity to hold lengthy negotiations. Besides, Djibouti has comparatively little political clout in the region, and business and trade interests will most likely dictate any 'Djibouti agenda'.

Abdiqassim is under great pressure to 'achieve' in extremely difficult and complex circumstances. But high expectations could quickly turn to disappointment. As a result, he may be tempted to rely heavily on his key backers – his sub-clan, *Hawiye-Ayr*, and the local business community. Ultimately, the new regime's accomplishments will be measured by how far Abdiqassim can reach beyond this traditional support base and bring security, national unity and reconstruction to a devastated and desperate country.

Lucy Hannan
Integrated Regional Information Networks

policy brief

THE SITUATION IN MOGADISHU could once more deteriorate into serious fighting. This is because neither the government of President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan nor the factions can claim overwhelming legitimacy in the Somali capital. Furthermore, groups within the government use the existence of the factions either as a tool to promote themselves and/or as a threat that should be met militarily.

There are four warlords who oppose the government:

HUSSEIN AIDEED (*Haber Gidir*: sub-clan *Saad*) is weak and currently does not have the means to go to war or to maintain his clients' networks. He owns very few 'technicals' (armed jeeps), although some of his kinsmen have money and would oppose any military move against him.

OSMAN ATO (*Haber Gidir*: sub-clan *Saad*) has lost most of his money, but his sub-sub-clan (*Reer Hilowle*) is very rich. Ato demonstrated his willingness to fight to the end when he confronted Mohammed Farah Aideed in Mogadishu in the spring and summer of 1996.

MUSE SUDI ALAYOW (*Abgal*: sub-clan *Wabudhan*) has a strong constituency among his sub-clan and controls a port and an airstrip on the outskirts of Mogadishu. Presently, he is the strongest militarily and can prevent the opening of the international port and airport in the capital.

MOHAMED QANYERE (*Murosade*: sub-clan *Fol-ulus*) built his military apparatus while serving as Minister of Interior in Mohammed Aideed's cabinet (1995–96) and through dubious trade. He has the capacity to mobilise a significant number of 'technicals'.

Of the four warlords, Qanyere and Hussein Aideed are the least reluctant to make a deal with the government in exchange for money, high political positions and an amnesty.

There is also deep division among the *Abgal*, which reside mostly in north Mogadishu. They are involved in what is essentially an intra-clan feud, loosely linked to the factional scissions in the city. The likelihood of a settlement has been complicated by the fact that some of the *Abgal* allied to the government are trying to use its resources to win the dispute. Furthermore, a majority of the *Abgal* only accepts the government because of clan discord. In the unlikely event that these rifts are resolved, the *Abgal* may reconsider their support for an administration that they believe to be dominated by the *Haber Gidir*, the clan of Abdiqassim.

Pointers In the restive province of Aceh in North Sumatra a new agreement between the pro-independence Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government has replaced the one-month moratorium on violence, which followed the largely unsuccessful 'humanitarian pause' of June 2000–January 2001. The accord is open-ended and is designed to precipitate an all-inclusive dialogue. Periodic reviews are planned.

The government is sending additional military personnel to the troubled region as part of its continuing security solution to what is essentially a political problem. For its part, GAM has said that it has very little confidence in the government's commitment to the new accord. Early indications are that the violence is continuing unabated: almost 200 people have died so far this year.

operational focus

THE KEY DIFFERENCE between an armed rabble and a disciplined professional military force is training. Between May and July 2000, the British Military Advisory Team (BMATT) ran a Command and Staff Course (CSC) for 40 Sierra Leonean officers in Accra, Ghana, the first substantive command and staff training that the Sierra Leone armed forces had received for at least nine years. Ghana's reasons for granting the CSC use of its Command and Staff College facilities and for allowing one of its officers to serve as a trainer in the programme were obviously tied in part to its regional security interests. But BMATT was also able to draw on the UK's long-term commitment to Ghana and West Africa – the post-colonial British military presence dates back to 1973 – in order to ensure that a West African perspective was integrated into the course. This illustrates the value of permanent engagement in Africa.

During the preparatory stages of the course, the political and military situation in Sierra Leone was still very tense. In spring 1999, the Economic Community of West African States' Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the Civil Defence Forces held only the Freetown Peninsula and a swathe of territory to the south and the east of the country. In the capital, Freetown, a curfew was in force between 6 P.M. and 6 A.M. The UN monitoring mission, UNOMSIL, had managed to re-establish itself following an advance by the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF), but a more substantive UN deployment was dependent on the outcome of the Lomé peace negotiations. The UK's involvement, however, was not directly predicated on the result of these talks. Although it promoted a diplomatic settlement in Sierra Leone, the UK had agreed, in 1998, with the democratically elected government to train and equip some 2,500 new soldiers.

Command and staff training for the Sierra Leone military

The successful conclusion of the Lomé Peace Accord on 7 July 1999 meant that the issue of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) had to be factored in. Would the Course now have to include the various 'non-statutory forces' in the programme? As it was, DDR was bedevilled by on-going arguments over whether former combatants, who were also potential recruits for the reformed armed forces, should receive the benefits associated with the DDR process. As a result of these delays, only officers from the 'regular' government forces, not former RUF or 'non-statutory' pro-government/anti-RUF units, were eligible for the course.

In addition, plans to train simultaneously both junior and senior staff officers were dropped, as it became clear that the Sierra Leone authorities would have trouble filling the senior positions. Subsequently however, a Higher Defence Management Briefing, initially linked to the CSC, took place in August 2000 for very senior military personnel, civil servants and civil-society groups. The course examined in some depth issues like democratic control and accountability of the armed forces. In many cases, this was the first time that such disparate groups had sat down and talked directly to each other.

In late April 2000, the RUF captured and murdered a number of UN peacekeepers from Kenya and Zambia, causing a rapid collapse of UN morale, and marking the start of another rebel advance on Freetown. Nonetheless, the acting Chief of Defence Staff of Sierra Leone took the brave decision on 15 May – six days before the course was due to begin – to go ahead with the course, despite the operational risk posed by losing 40 key middle-ranking officers at the height of the crisis.

The course was broadly divided into two parts: the first focused on the fundamentals of staff duty and military organisation; the second was more directly concerned with tactical issues. Throughout the course there was a strong emphasis on the application of military law, including on the law of armed conflict (delivered by the International Committee of the Red Cross) and on the rights of a child in armed conflict (given by Save the Children). A week was dedicated to discussion on, *inter alia*, the military and society and the nature of democracy. In general, the course was well received and students were keen to improve themselves.

When there were problems, these were directly related to the general state of the Sierra Leone armed forces. Levels of self-discipline were not high and it was clear that formal rank structures had been discredited. Court-martials

and other disciplinary measures had been used as instruments of political repression. Consequently, the relationship between the ranks had been undermined.

While the outward manifestations of discipline were seemingly intact, mutual respect between junior and senior officers was fragile and on occasion it broke down completely. In addition, all students were concerned about their future employment, since none of them were guaranteed a place in the future military, and the fact that they would be regarded with suspicion and jealousy on their return.

Despite the above, 39 of the 40 students successfully completed the course: over 40% of them achieved the required student end-state, identified as the ability to act as staff officers in unit and formation headquarters, and a further 25% were close. By August 2000, the graduating officers were beginning to be placed in positions where they could use the skills that they had acquired, either in an individual capacity or alongside an International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) officer.

The Sierra Leone military faces numerous and profound challenges. The 'deprofessionalisation' of the armed forces was a reflection of the broader subversion of all parts of society. Military reform will take time and will only be complete when Sierra Leonean society is at ease with itself.

Colonel Simon Diggins
Director, Command and Staff Course

The Journal of Conflict, Security & Development

The Centre for Defence Studies is to publish the inaugural edition of *Conflict, Security & Development* in March 2001. Many journals cover issues and themes relating to governance, conflict, security and development, but none of them are dedicated solely to analysing the relationship between security policy and development or to bridging related disciplines. Not only does *Conflict, Security & Development* fill this vacuum with intellectually provocative and objective analysis, but also it provides an accessible, interactive forum for the cross-fertilisation of ideas and perspectives, and for reasoned and rigorous debate between members of the northern and southern hemispheres. For more information, contact Richard Jones on +44 (0)207 848 2947 or by e-mail at rick.jones@kcl.ac.uk

NICI DAHRENDORF was in Indonesia for two weeks as part of an inter-departmental visit with the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID). She also continued her work on human trafficking. The Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) held an in-house meeting on trafficking issues with the Centre for Defence Studies' Mediterranean Security Group.

COLONEL PHIL WILKINSON OBE has been tracking the follow-up to the Brahimi Report, and has been generating support for its recommendations. He has also provided analysis on the European Union (EU)'s 'Pillar Two' initiatives for crisis management and on the EU's capacity to conduct peace operations in line with the Brahimi proposals. Phil continued to monitor doctrinal developments regarding civil-military relations, and liaised with the UK Ministry of Defence on the issue on behalf of DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD).

DR KARIN VON HIPPEL participated in a CHAD – Emergency Response Division (UN Development Programme) retreat in New York. She also gave evidence to the UK Foreign Affairs Committee on the treatment of minorities in Kosovo.

DR COMFORT ERO was part of a CHAD team conducting strategic level conflict analysis in the Solomon Islands and Fiji. The report of the

mission is currently being edited. She also gave a presentation at an FCO academic study day on 'what UK policy in Sierra Leone should have been' since the 4 May 2000 intervention.

DYLAN HENDRICKSON attended a workshop in Senegal on the changing role of the military, sponsored by the Global Coalition for Africa. The discussions focused on the new security dilemmas facing African countries and the challenges they must overcome to address them. He also helped to facilitate a DFID-sponsored workshop in Uganda, exploring options to improve the management of resources within the security sector. In addition, Dylan edited the fourth title in the CSDG Working Paper series: *Reforming South-East Asian Security Sectors* by Tim Huxley. The paper is due to be published in March 2001; ordering details and information on forthcoming CSDG Working Papers can be obtained from Richard Jones at rick.jones@kcl.ac.uk.

ROXANNE BAZERGAN attended a UNAIDS expert strategy meeting on HIV/AIDS as a security issue, in Stockholm, Sweden. She has continued her research on the impact of the pandemic on security, the armed forces and vulnerable populations during conflict. She is currently advising CHAD on their policy approach towards HIV/AIDS and conflict in preparation for the UN General Assembly Special Session, which is scheduled for June 2001.

ALISON DALE has been making arrangements for the Brahimi workshop, which is to take place on 6 March 2001 in London, UK. The workshop is entitled *Public Security and the rule of Law from a European Perspective*, and attendance is by invitation only.

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