

bulletin

The Conflict, Security
& Development Group

Security-sector reform should be a core objective for all parties concerned with promoting peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

This requires an indirect approach that focuses on achieving democratic governance in a future Palestinian state. However, even before the recent outbreak of violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat and members of the new élite had embraced the reform agenda only nominally and with utmost reluctance. And they have chafed at the limited external pressure to improve governance in the areas of financial management, civil-service recruitment, and the rule of law generally. This is unfortunate and ironic, since reform of Palestinian public institutions is key to viable statehood and genuine independence and to the long-term legitimacy and durability of peace.

The relationship between security and governance in its wider sense is central to security-sector reform in the Palestinian context. One main determinant of the relationship is the neo-patrimonial system of political management that was inherited from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and has evolved under the PA. (The PA was established in May 1994 under the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO to provide autonomous government for the local Palestinian population for an initial interim five-year period.) The other is the structure of PA political institutions, legal jurisdiction, and bureaucratic powers and privileges, as defined in the series of Palestinian–Israeli agreements concluded since 1994 and known collectively as the ‘Oslo framework’. These determinants invested all real power in the executive, rather than in the nascent legislature and judiciary.

The September 1995 Palestinian–Israeli Interim Agreement On The West Bank & The Gaza Strip (‘Oslo II’) deepened this concentration of power. Arafat, who was already PLO Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, now assumed the additional role of President of the PA and Minister of Interior. This has allowed

In this issue . . . a special extended article on the Palestinian police by Dr Yezid Sayigh, a feature piece on Ghana’s security sector by Eboe Hutchful, *Policy Brief* by Nici Dahrendorf on the Brahimi Report, and *Operational Focus* by Napoleon Abdulai on the West African Moratorium.

him to issue legal decrees (with the force of law) in all spheres, make appointments at all levels of the civil service and the Palestinian Police Force (PF), establish or dissolve public institutions, and disburse sizeable public funds without audit.

The transition to Palestinian statehood is likely to be accompanied by political and economic manoeuvring, which will certainly involve the security sector, posing dangers to stability and democracy in the new state.

The Palestinian Police Force

The PF was formed in 1994 in response to Israel's desire for a 'strong police force' to ensure law and order in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As the only security apparatus, it was to prevent attacks on Israeli settlers and troops in the autonomous areas during the interim period, which has been informally extended since May 1999.

The PF has achieved not inconsiderable success in meeting these tasks, and the rank-and-file are reasonably cohesive and law abiding, certainly no less so than military and police forces in many other countries emerging from conflict.

The Oslo framework's emphasis on preventing violence against Israeli targets explains Israel's willingness to allow the PF to expand from its original strength of 9,000 (agreed in 1994) to 30,000 under Oslo II. For the same reason, Israel (and the US) welcomed Arafat's establishment in 1996 of 'state security courts' to try militant opponents of the peace process. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and local human-rights groups have condemned these courts, which are closed and offer no right of appeal.

Subsequent unapproved increases to the PF added a further 10,000 personnel to its ranks. Israel also in effect acquiesced in the PA's procurement of smuggled weapons to arm

these recruits (above the original ceiling of 4,000 pistols and 11,000 rifles). And a largely blind eye was turned to the arming of *Fatah* – the former PLO guerrilla group headed by Arafat, which now acts as the government party and as an extension of the PA's security structure – from black-market sources.

The PF: in practice and on paper

In general, though, the experience of the PA suggests a pressing need for security-sector reform. Various PF branches have been implicated in human-rights abuses, illicit business activities, infringements on civil liberties and media freedom, and encroachment on each other's jurisdiction and on that of municipal authorities. Rivalry between agencies supposedly subordinate to the PF's overall command structure has led to fragmentation, occasional physical confrontation, and the appearance of armed factions among civilians loyal to one agency or another.

According to Oslo II, the PF forms a single, integral unit under the PA's control. It is composed of six operational branches: Civilian Police; Preventative Security; Presidential Security; General Intelligence; Civil Defence (emergency services and rescue); and the Public Security Force. The latter comprises six additional units: Intelligence; Coastal Police; Aviation Police; Border Police; Customs Police; and Disciplinary Police.

However, severe Israeli restrictions on movement have considerably impeded the PF's evolution as a single, cohesive and effective government sector. Under the Oslo framework, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were parcelled into non-contiguous territorial enclaves (divided by large swathes of Israeli-held land and settlement blocs). The Force has to operate within the bifurcated legal, judicial and administrative systems inherited from the former Jordanian civilian administration of the West

Bank and the Egyptian military administration of the Gaza Strip (1949–67) and from the Israeli military government (since 1967). In addition, parallel PF commands and branches have had to be formed in each autonomous enclave. This has reinforced divisions within the Force and the tendency by the heads of its various branches to regard their commands as power bases, especially for a potential struggle over the succession to the ailing President.

Furthermore, the Oslo framework assured Israel of continued ultimate control over all spheres of activity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (including security, population register and residence, land use, internal movement and external trade). The PA may not issue identity cards, residence permits, import licences, or any of the myriad papers vital to the functioning of a modern society and economy without Israeli approval. But, by the same token, the captive nature of the local Palestinian society and economy has offered senior PA officials numerous rent-seeking opportunities. Certain PF branches or commanders have additional opportunities owing to their control of the access points for Palestinian imports and exports, and their ability to protect and engage in lucrative ventures, such as fuel supplies and the gambling casino in Jericho.

The PF is nominally under the command of General Nasr Yusif, a former PLO brigade commander. In reality, each of its six branches (and some of their subordinate sections) report directly and separately to Arafat. This has given rise to the widely held perception among Palestinians and the international community that there is an uncontrolled and *ad hoc* proliferation of security agencies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. More importantly, the PF is not in any way accountable to the PA's Council of Ministers or to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), since it answers to Arafat as President of the PA and as Comman-

der-in-Chief of the PLO, rather than in his capacity as Minister of Interior.

Arafat established the Higher Council for National Security (HCNS) in 1994 as a consultative and co-ordinating body in operational matters, effectively supplanting the PF's headquarters. The Force has been unable to centralise or standardise administration and support functions, especially training, procurement, construction of facilities, and financial management. Instead, each PF branch is self-managing, further impeding operational accountability, as well as political and financial oversight.

Nonetheless, the HCNS sought to clarify the division of labour between various PF branches concerning powers of detention and interrogation in security and civilian cases. In 1998 it also drafted standardised mission statements and rules of engagement, but these have yet to be ratified by Arafat. Its own rules of procedure and operational remit remain informal. Even

Palestinian security capabilities

Public security	14,000 ^a
Civil police	10,000 ^b
Preventive security	3,000 ^c
General intelligence	3,000
Military intelligence	500
Presidential intelligence	3,000
Coastal police	unknown
Civil defence	unknown
Air force	unknown
Excise police	unknown
Projected total	40,000

a 8,000 in West Bank, 6,000 in Gaza Strip

b 6,000 in West Bank, 4,000 in Gaza Strip

c 1,200 in West Bank, 1,800 in Gaza Strip

Source Military Balance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2000)



Members of the PF on parade at a police training camp near Gaza City, May 1999.

when documents have been formally adopted, such as the internal statutes inherited from the PLO's Palestinian National Liberation Army governing internal disciplinary and personnel matters, application remains subject to the will of the President.

A concise agenda for reform

Realistically, there is little chance of genuine reform, whether of the security sector or of governance more generally, as long as the overriding priority for the international community is the survival of the peace process, and for Palestinians is to attain sovereign statehood, with its attendant political and economic independence and territorial integrity. While independence is clearly a crucial requisite if reform is to have any hope of rising up the public agenda, it is by no means a panacea. The Palestinian state may choose to maintain the basic levers and controls that keep its society and market captive, unless there is a conscious and sustained effort from the outset to establish genuine political and economic democracy. Meaningful and lasting security-sector reform is contingent on the attainment of democratic governance, the main pillars of which are the

rule-of-law 'basket' (encompassing constitutional oversight, a functioning and independent judiciary, and human rights), transparent public finance, and civil-service reform.

This means bringing the PF under clear civil authority, and making it subject to political and budgetary oversight by the PLC. The judicial system remains in disrepair after six years of PA rule and urgently needs revival if the PF is to observe proper legal procedures, including the use of warrants, and is to enforce court orders. Yet Arafat has so far refused to ratify the Judicial Independence Law, or to restrict the remit of the state security courts, clarify their legal framework, and provide for appeal to the Supreme Court (as a first step towards abolishing them).

The PF should also be made subject to external audit by a body that reports to the legislature. Corruption is not yet prevalent among PF rank-and-file, but the confusion of public office and private gain promotes a culture in which members of the public expect preferential treatment and services in return for material favours. Yet, transparency in PF finances would not only reinforce democratic, civilian oversight of the security sector, it would

also reduce the distortions caused by illicit PF interventions in commerce and informal taxation, thus increasing public revenue. This could, in turn, allow the basic salary of PF personnel to rise – pay is one-third lower than in the civil service and below the level required to avoid poverty. Low pay makes it extremely difficult to attract high-quality recruits.

The argument presented here directly belies the Western tendency to approach security-sector reform through technical assistance and training, rather than by undertaking political initiatives to bring security under democratic control. When discussed at all, the wider issue of security-sector reform has been taken up in high-level political contacts with Arafat, and then only occasionally and in an oblique

manner. Yet the international community, which has disbursed some \$500 million per year to the Palestinians in technical assistance, infrastructure projects, and emergency budgetary support since 1994, clearly has the means, the leverage and the interest to seek a more effective and credible PA response.

Dr Yezid Sayigh is Assistant Director of Studies, Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University, and Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the IISS. He advised the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks with Israel (1991–93), and helped negotiate the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area Implementation Agreement and its Security Protocol. He headed the Palestinian delegation to the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (1992–94).

policy brief

Nici Dahrendorf, Director of the CSDG

The Panel on UN Peace Operations issued its conclusions and recommendations in the Brahimi Report on 21 August 2000. The Report focuses on the strategic direction of the UN, its decision-making process, as well as rapid deployment, operational planning and support, and the use of information technology in peacekeeping missions.

The Report emphasises the links between military peacekeeping and wider peace building, and highlights the need for clarification of the roles and responsibilities of donors and agencies in crisis situations. It recommends, for instance, that the UN Development Programme play a more central co-ordinating role in post-conflict situations. Given the confusion over roles and the duplication of efforts that have hampered past UN operations, the Report considers issues such as civilian staff recruitment, local funding and procurement procedures.

The UN Deputy Secretary-General, Louise Frechette, has been appointed to oversee the preparation of a detailed implementation plan. Seventeen UN sub-groups are feeding into the process and individual UN agencies will also contribute. The Security Council has established a working group to build on the recommendations of the Panel. A budgetary decision on the feasibility of the conclusions will be made by mid-2001.

Less influential and developing countries, however, are concerned that the UN is shifting its focus towards peacekeeping and away from development priorities. Any practical measures will thus need to stress the relationship between peace and development.

The UK Department for International Development is funding a series of seminars in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the US. It aims to bring together key actors from government, the military, civil society and regional organisations to discuss ideas for the implementation of the Brahimi recommendations. The Centre for Defence Studies and the International Institute for Strategic Studies are organising the European seminar in London.

Towards a new era in Ghana?

Ghanaians go to the polls in December 2000 to elect the first fully civilian regime in 20 years.

Whichever government succeeds the administration of President Jerry Rawlings, who is expected to step down, will confront two key issues: how to sustain the security system; and how to strengthen civil–military relations beyond the present fragile manifestation of stability. These issues, however, have received little systematic attention in the run-up to the election, although the leading opposition party, the New Patriotic Party, has expressed sharp concerns about security and the armed forces in its recent manifesto. Public anxiety about the armed forces has also been heightened by the rise in election-related violence. In addition, the public has little confidence in the abilities of the opposition parties to control the armed forces (a factor that counted against them in the 1992 polls). Even a win for the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) will not guarantee a subservient military, since durable civil–military relations in Ghana (like the rest of Africa) have typically been constructed along personal rather than party lines.

Ghana suffered a debilitating cycle of military coups between the 1960s and the 1980s, and its civilian governments have a poor record of reining in the armed forces and keeping them out of politics. In 1969 and 1979, the civilian authorities of the time were overthrown barely two years after replacing military regimes. More recently, abusive behaviour by elements of the armed forces appears to have intensified, and

the security forces have proven relatively ineffective in the face of endemic low-level violence. Consequently, poorly regulated private-security companies are flourishing.

Rawlings' legacy seems to be unravelling even before his formal departure from power. Policy coherence and the quality of governance have declined markedly, corruption is again rife, and the economic 'success story', which provided the backdrop for social and political peace, has begun to falter significantly. And internal succession disputes and factional bickering have split the NDC, leading to the departure of some of its ablest grassroots militants.

The Rawlings legacy

Under the Rawlings administration, Ghana has gone through a remarkable transformation and, despite its recent problems, is considered one of the more stable states in West Africa. The security sector has been at the centre of this transformation, providing the enabling environment for broader (and often painful) national reforms and conducting internal changes. Even critics of the Rawlings regime concede that much has been accomplished in professionalising and disciplining the armed forces and stabilising civil–military relations. Nevertheless, they point out that the process involved little transparency and accountability and that the regime's strategies were frequently unorthodox. The prevailing nature of civil–military relations is viewed as one of the key constraints on further democratisation.

Rawlings took power on 4 June 1979 in the country's first violent 'rank' coup. After briefly handing back power to an elected civilian administration in July 1979, he staged a second

coup on 31 December 1981 and established the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), the forerunner to the NDC. The PNDC consolidated its control through popular committees of radical soldiers and civilian mass organisations and by manipulating tensions within the army. It should be noted, moreover, that, until the PNDC came to power, military regimes had had little success in imposing political control over the armed forces.

From the late 1980s, the focus switched to demilitarising the regime, re-professionalising the security forces, and institution building. The PNDC also made radical changes in the area of security management:

- security was given unprecedented priority, with emphasis on effective intelligence;
- parallel and multiple security organs were set up;
- the formal state security system was linked with popular grassroots security arrangements, such as popular committees and civil-defence organisations;
- the operations of the entire range of security forces – military, police, intelligence, and even immigration and customs – were integrated for internal-security purposes (a departure from the traditional division of labour);
- security policy and development processes were closely articulated; and
- defence expenditure was cut significantly, as part of fiscal rationalisation.

The PNDC's approach, however, left considerable ambiguity over the role, structure and loyalty of the security forces, which was not resolved by the 'democratic transition' of 1992. The 1992 Constitution, for instance, introduced a range of governance institutions in the security sector, advancing the modest initiatives begun by the PNDC. But the NDC retained, in substance if not in form, some of its informal security structures, circumventing the constitutional process.

At the same time, though, it has played an important role in institution building. The 1996 Security and Intelligence Act, for example, was central to defining the new governance framework in Ghana.

The NDC's policy has thus been contradictory: promoting some of the most important and comprehensive institution-building

there are also broader historical legacies and forces that undermine stable and democratic civil–military relations in Ghana

processes, while perpetuating and operating informal structures and controls. And although the regime may have created a more professional and capable security force, critics believe that it is loyal to Rawlings personally. They highlight the perceived dominance of ethnic *Ewes* in the armed forces, and the autonomous power wielded by the ranks and by certain officers who enjoy direct access to the president.

There are also broader historical legacies and forces that undermine stable and democratic civil–military relations in Ghana. Among these are institutionalised secrecy and lack of transparency, which deepened with the militarisation of Ghanaian politics. The Rawlings regime has been extremely reticent about defence and security issues. Given that the major opposition parties have also failed to advance any coherent policy positions or to promote public debate, understanding of the

concepts of democratic civil–military relations is poorly developed in the country.

Some 43 years after independence, Ghana still does not have a defence policy framework, even though the problems this poses for defence management have long been recognised. Strategic objectives are at best poorly articulated and defined. The armed forces' missions are expressed in diffuse and expanding terms, combining traditional and new external defence and peace-keeping roles with a variety of internal-security, crime-control, and development functions. No attempt has been made, though, to examine the implications this raises for the democratic order or for core military capabilities. Many 'new' military operations are self-ascribed, as the civil authorities fail to assign corporate missions.

This role expansion has occurred despite severe budgetary constraints, which have had a debilitating impact on military infrastructure. Military spending as a proportion of total government expenditure fell from 8–9% in the mid-1970s to less than 4% at the end of the 1980s, where it remains today. The size of the armed forces currently stands at approximately 7,000 personnel, well below the constitutionally mandated strength of 22,000. This has limited its ability to fulfil internal-security tasks and to contribute to international and sub-regional peacekeeping operations. That budgetary stringency is now accepted as a fact of life, and not justification for a coup, is a positive sign of maturing civil–military relations.

Civil-oversight bodies are also hampered by limited institutional capacity. In parliament, for instance, the Committee on Defence and Interior is responsible for both the armed forces and the police, as well as for a wide range of additional functions connected to the Interior portfolio. It is overburdened, under-resourced and lacks clarity about its mandate. The general need for conceptual consensus on oversight issues is demonstrated by the conflict about

civil auditing of military spending and operations. The military insists that this cannot extend to sensitive equipment like arms and ammunition supplies.

The security agencies presently acknowledge civil control and refrain from interfering in the political decision-making process. In practice, though, the armed forces, and to a lesser extent other security bodies, have considerable autonomy in the way that they run their affairs.

Implications for the military

The Rawlings regime has been a polarising and deeply ambiguous experience for the armed forces. The military is caught between two contrasting models: one calling for professionalism and obedience to the constitutional authorities; and another (an activist model) implying at best conditional subordination.

Under Minister of Defence Lt-Colonel Enoch Donkoh (ret.), there has been some progress towards transparency and accountability. Furthermore, there is greater readiness within the armed forces to open up progressively, to take action against infractions by members of the military, and to curb immunity. There are many in the higher ranks who feel that the armed forces have been compromised by too close an association with Rawlings. (It is interesting to note that, in previous elections, opposition parties have done rather well in some constituencies dominated by the military.) They see the elections as an opportunity to distance themselves from politics and from the ruling regime, to assert the constitutional autonomy and neutrality of the armed forces, and to professionalise fully. Commanders and senior officers believe that their interests are best served through professionalisation and civil control and oversight, even if they might question the capabilities of some civil institutions. By contrast, this may well be a time of insecurity and concern for soldiers, particularly

in the lower ranks, who regard Rawlings as their patron.

Conclusion

The unorthodox security system put in place by the current regime will be a major challenge to the incoming civilian president – even for Rawlings' anointed successor, vice-President John Atta Mills. The regime's security policies involved professionalisation and institution building, and also perpetuated and exploited informal and personalistic modes of control.

While informal controls are not necessarily inconsistent with long-term institution building, they do need to be supplanted by normative consensus on civil–military relations and oversight. The critical question is whether the democratic process can build on the positive aspects of Rawlings' heritage or whether all of this will come apart.

Eboe Hutchful
Executive Director, African Security Dialogue and Research, Ghana.

THE READY AVAILABILITY of small arms has exacerbated conflicts in West Africa, which have claimed the lives of some two million people over the past decade. In an effort to tackle the problem, members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed a Moratorium on the Import, Export and Manufacture of Light Weapons in October 1998. The Moratorium, which expires in October 2001, is a voluntary commitment reinforced by a Code of Conduct – in essence, it is a confidence-building measure.

To support implementation of the Moratorium, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), in March 1999, established the five-year Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED). Based in Mali, PCASED's central mandate relates to the destruction of small arms and the demilitarisation of the sub-region. It has no real authority and therefore relies on the political will of ECOWAS and the support of donor countries.

Initially, PCASED's Plan of Action consisted of nine priorities: establishing a culture of peace; training for military, security and police forces; enhancing weapons control at border posts; establishing a small-arms and light

operational focus

Consolidating the West African Moratorium

weapons register; collecting and destroying surplus and unauthorised weapons; facilitating dialogue with producers/suppliers; reviewing and harmonising national legislative and administrative procedures; mobilising resources for PCASED's objectives and activities; and enlarging membership of the Moratorium.

Following an informal review in May 2000 by the UN, PCASED and ECOWAS, these nine areas were redefined and reduced to five: establishment of National Commissions to prevent small-arms proliferation; mobilisation of resources for PCASED activities; information, communication and awareness campaigns; training of military and security forces and border patrols; and the setting up of the arms register and database.

Operations were downsized due to financial and operational difficulties, and to make a more visible impact. New emphasis was placed on the National Commissions – originally conceived in the Code of Conduct – that allow PCASED to operate at the country level. Projects, such as ‘arms-for-development’ and the training of security forces, are implemented through the Commissions. So far, however, only three countries – Guinea, Mali and Niger – have functioning National Commissions. Benin, Burkina Faso, Liberia and Nigeria have recently set up or inaugurated their Commissions, while Ghana and Togo have Committees on small-arms proliferation, essentially performing the same function.

The UN’s bureaucratic nature stalled staff recruitment, and thereby hindered the operationalisation of PCASED. Nevertheless, the Programme has implemented a number of projects including:

- the July 1999 destruction of over 19,000 small arms and light weapons, 600 heavy guns and more than two million rounds of ammunition in Liberia. The German Technical Cooperation is converting the remains into agricultural implements. (Mali’s National Commission is planning to dispose of arms in Mopti and Timbuktu at the end of 2000. And the Ghana government has carried out an arms inventory – privately-owned arms are to be re-registered);
- the provision of technical and financial support to the Niger government and civil society for the decommissioning of hundreds of weapons in Agadez on 25 September 2000;
- the development of a regional curriculum for training armed security forces in West Africa.

The instruction of trainers will begin in December 2000 in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

The Programme is seeking donor support to provide international trainers;

- a database and arms register is expected to be in operation by the end of 2000;
- a major arms collection project has been initiated in Guinea-Bissau, with the support of the UN Office for Peace Building and the Department of Disarmament Affairs; and
- technical and financial support is in the pipeline to the government of Sierra Leone for the destruction of arms collected during the disarmament process.

Financial constraints, though, are a major obstacle to PCASED’s implementation. The Programme’s original five-year budget was \$13m, but it has received only around \$5m. (At present, the major donors comprise the UNDP, Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Mali, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.) In addition to budgetary problems, the lack of sustained political will among West African governments is effecting the setting up and functioning of the National Commissions.

Strengthening and accelerating the collection and decommissioning of some eight million surplus small arms, and providing technical and financial support to the National Commissions, are the most important immediate tasks for PCASED, ECOWAS and donor states. Provision of all-weather vehicles, for example, would assist small-scale local arms-collection initiatives, reduce the cost of large-scale arms destruction, and help instil confidence in the local population.

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Napoleon Abdulai
PCASED/UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

The Conflict, Security
& Development Group

update

DR CHRIS SMITH has left the Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) to concentrate on the development of a new Centre for South Asia Studies at King's College, London, and on his own research projects. He is also establishing two new MA programmes for the War Studies Group at King's College. He will continue to work on an occasional basis for the UK Department for International Development (DFID), but in an individual capacity.

NICI DAHRENDORF is the new Director of the CSDG. She is advising DFID on how to take forward recommendations made in the Brahimi Report on the UN and peacekeeping. Nici also carried out field research in Burma, Laos and Thailand on human trafficking. The CSDG mandate is expanding to include conflict impact assessments, political and economic analyses, as well as security-sector reform.

DR KARIN VON HIPPEL joined the CSDG in November as a senior research fellow. She has spent several years working in the field for the UN, and was, *inter alia*, a political advisor to the Representative of the Secretary General at the UN Political Office for Somalia. She participated in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development-led peace initiative in Ethiopia. Karin was in the Civil Administration 'pillar' of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, responsible for the protection of minorities. Her latest publication, *Democracy by Force* was short-listed for the Westminster Medal for Military Literature. Karin's areas of interest include military intervention, democratisation, UN reform, and post-conflict reconstruction.

COL. PHIL WILKINSON OBE has been examining the processes involved in formulating a defence White Paper. His other work has focused on peace-support operations, gender issues, and on

ensuring compatibility between the UK Ministry of Defence's paper on civil-military co-operation and the activities and aspirations of DFID, non-governmental organisations, host governments, and local organisations and citizens. In addition, Phil has contributed to the UK's response to the Brahimi Report.

DYLAN HENDRICKSON is completing a study, in conjunction with Nicole Ball of the Overseas Development Council, Washington, DC, on off-budget military expenditure and revenue. The preliminary results have been presented to representatives of DFID and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He carried out research in Cambodia, examining issues pertaining to military spending, demobilisation, military reform, and related International Monetary Fund and World Bank policies. Dylan briefed DFID governance advisors at regional gatherings in Kenya, Indonesia, and the UK on the challenges of providing security-sector assistance, and continues to work on the security-sector-assistance guidelines. He also attended a consultation in Paris on the forthcoming Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee policy note on conflict prevention, which includes security-sector-reform issues.

DR COMFORT ERO wrote an assessment of the causes of conflict in the Solomon Islands, and has produced profiles with Roxanne Bazergan on Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Lower Income countries in Africa and Asia. She gave a paper on 'Democratic Governance of Security Forces in Sierra Leone: Understanding the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Political Violence', at a workshop on strengthening democratic governance in conflict-torn societies, organised by Witswatersrand University, South Africa. Comfort also gave a talk on the regional dimensions of security-sector reform at the South Africa-Nigeria roundtable on democratic control of military and security establishments and presented a paper on 'Africa's Global Impact' to the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford.

ALISON DALE has joined the CSDG as its new Programme Administrator. She has a BA (hons) in Politics and International Relations and an MA in International Security Studies from the University of Reading. Her areas of interest include biological and chemical weapons, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

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