

bulletin

The Conflict, Security
& Development Group

The spread of HIV/AIDS is one of the most serious and potentially destabilising non-military security threats facing developing countries.

In recognition of this fact, the UN Security Council (UNSC) – in an unprecedented move – devoted its first session of 2000 exclusively to the impact of the virus on peace and security in Africa. In 1998 alone, 10 times as many Africans died as a result of AIDS-related illnesses than were killed through conflict. Some 24.5 million people are currently infected with HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa.

But the problem is not confined to Africa: in South and Southeast Asia, for example, around 5.6m people are believed to be living with HIV/AIDS. In fact, the disease is spreading fastest in this region, with India at the epicentre.

Impact of HIV/AIDS

First and foremost, of course, it is the individual and his/her family who suffer the direct and immediate consequences of HIV/AIDS. But, at the macro level, the pandemic has a number of wider ramifications, challenging human rights and gender relations, reversing developmental gains, exacerbating socio-economic crises, and undermining 'human security'.

Throughout the developing world, HIV/AIDS threatens to deplete the supply of labour and reverse economic progress. The UN Development Programme estimates that HIV/AIDS will reduce African gross domestic product (GDP) by around one-third over the next 20 years. In addition, it overwhelms public health systems (where they exist) and changes the demographic composition of states and societies. Children, whose parents have died from AIDS-related diseases, are becoming an ostracised generation and a 'massive social time-bomb'.

The high death rate among professionals in developing countries undercuts gains in good

In this issue . . . Roxanne Bazergan on HIV/AIDS and the military and Dr Comfort Ero on civil oversight of the security forces. *Operational Focus* by Colonel Phil Wilkinson on national security reviews, *Policy Brief* on aid to Afghanistan by Thomas Withington, as well as regular features: *Pointers*, *Timeline*, *Webwatch* and *Update*.

governance and destroys institutional memory. According to the UN, 25–50% of personnel in the health, education, security and civil services in Africa are expected to die from AIDS-related diseases within the next 5–10 years. At present,

the military . . . is increasingly being flagged as a key vector of HIV, as soldiers are frequently deployed on long tours of duty and are imbued with a risk-taking ethos

as many Zambian teachers die in one year as are trained. HIV is also undermining food security: in Zimbabwe, communal agriculture productivity (much of it subsistence farming) fell by around 50% in 1993–98, largely due to HIV/AIDS.

Factors of underdevelopment, like poverty, inadequate education, and poor health care, fuel the pandemic, which, in turn, stagnates development. This feeds a destructive cycle that threatens social and political stability and can even lead to conflict, itself a prime harbinger for the spread of HIV. The US National Intelligence Council noted in January 2000 that the ‘severe social and economic impact of infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, and the infiltration of these diseases into the ruling political and military élite and middle classes of developing countries are likely to intensify the struggle for political power to control scarce resources’.

HIV and the military

In 1960, the Congo descended into one of the most disruptive and violent civil wars in Africa’s history. One theory also links the conflict with the early spread of HIV, passed through the deployment of armies, largely composed of young, sexually active men, and the mass movement of refugees. It is reported that female refugees are six times more likely to become infected in camps than in the outside world.

But it is the military that is increasingly being flagged as a key vector of HIV, as soldiers are frequently deployed on long tours of duty and are imbued with a risk-taking ethos. Sexually transmitted infections (STI) are often used as surrogate markers for the virus, since they are easier to detect and their presence increases the risk of HIV transmission five to 20 fold. According to a study by the Civil–Military Alliance to Combat HIV and AIDS, ‘. . . peacetime STI infection rates among military populations are two to five times higher than in civilian societies . . . During wartime, military risk increases by as much as 100 times that of civilians . . . Although all militaries are affected by HIV/AIDS, those of the developing world are especially vulnerable. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, ministries of defence report averages of 20% to 40% HIV-positivity within their armed services, with rates of 50% to 60% in a few countries where the virus has been present for over 10 years’. Some reports even suggest that, in the Zimbabwean army, the infection rate is as high as 90%.

At present, levels of infection in Asia are much lower. In 1998, *The Hindustan Times* reported that, in on-going screenings, 6,000 members of the Indian army had tested positive for HIV. Estimated rates for the Cambodian and Thai militaries are 6% and 2.5%, respectively

Loss of personnel as a result of HIV/AIDS compromises an army’s combat readiness, particularly its ability to deploy at short notice,

and upsets the continuity of command. In addition, training new recruits requires extra scarce resources, which many of these countries can ill-afford.

High military infection rates also impact on a state's civilian population. For instance, a 1997 study found a correlation between HIV clusters in northern Namibia and the location of military bases, partly attributable to sexual relations between soldiers and the local population. The demobilisation of troops, often in response to donor pressure, also presents a problem, as HIV-infected personnel place new demands on re-integration schemes.

Contaminated blood is another primary source of infection. Testing in the field tends, at best, to be rudimentary, heightening the risk of diffusion among wounded soldiers. But the danger also extends to the civilian population, as the military has been a traditional institutional donor of blood, and civilian screening of supplies is haphazard in many developing countries. *The Times of India* reported in May 2000 that the country's northern state of Bihar

'does not have even one blood bank complying with the guidelines approved by the World Health Organization and standards set by the supreme court'. India as a whole has only 40 such approved banks. The South African military reportedly withdrew from blood donation schemes in 1985, citing 'security reasons'.


Botswana and Uganda provide two examples of developing-country responses to HIV in the military. The latter has an aggressive testing and prevention programme. HIV-positive officers are excluded from service, and their HIV status can also be criterion for demobilisation. The army's infection level is now said to be lower than that of the civilian population. Some credit for this achievement lies with President Yoweri Museveni, who has talked openly and with candour about the HIV issue.

In Botswana, HIV-positive Botswana Defence Force (BDF) personnel can be deployed internally 'until a medical officer advises otherwise'. Discharged soldiers, and those who leave on compassionate grounds, receive full medical benefits, and all personnel and their families receive training and counselling. HIV examinations are voluntary, except in specific situations, such as overseas deployment.

As the Civil-Military Alliance points out, however, the pandemic is '... not a war-stopper (it does not immediately take soldiers out of the front line). Thus many militaries have been slow to initiate HIV/AIDS programmes and have remained distanced from civilian programmes'.

Peacekeeping operations

On 17 July 2000, the UNSC adopted a resolution acknowledging the fact that peacekeeping troops risk contracting and spreading HIV. The Council recognised 'the need to incorporate HIV/AIDS prevention awareness skills and advice in aspects of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations' training for peacekeeping personnel'.



pointers

Troops are often stationed for extended periods in stressful and foreign environments. They are removed from their families and familiar cultures that might normally regulate their behaviour. In addition, they have disposable income to spend in the false economies that grow up around them. According to a UNAIDS study, '... 45% of Dutch navy and marine personnel on peacekeeping duty in Cambodia had sexual contact with sex workers or other members of the local population during a five month tour. Often condoms were not used consistently'. In 1994, a study by Save the Children suspected a link between the increasing prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Monrovia, Liberia, and the sex industry that had developed around the international peacekeeping mission, often involving young girls.

The UN stipulates that prospective peacekeeping troops be screened for HIV, but it is difficult to enforce this rule. Not all contributing governments comply – peacekeeping is a lucrative source of revenue for many developing countries – and lapses have sometimes been overlooked for fear that a state might withdraw its contribution. The possibility of infection, though, cuts both ways: peacekeepers might spread HIV among the host population or pass it to their communities after catching it while serving in the field.

The Times of India reported in 1993 that as many as 45 Indian peacekeepers returning from duty with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992–93) had tested positive for HIV. Similarly, 'a large number' of Cuban veterans returning from the war in Angola were sero-positive. Cuba checked the spread to civilians through its quarantine *sanitorios* scheme.

On 7 September 2000, the UNSC declared its intention to strengthen the organisation's central role in peacekeeping, particularly in Africa. And it reiterated 'its determination to continue to sensitize peacekeeping personnel

► The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been dispatching delegations to Africa in search of new arms-sales contracts. Countries visited include: Angola; Botswana; Namibia; South Africa; and Tanzania. According to official government statistics, the PLA has 22 international arms-export contracts, only two of which are with African nations. New arms deals may be a means of distancing the PLA from the Chinese economy, but they could further destabilise the balance of power on the African continent.

in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS in all operations'.

Conclusion

If HIV/AIDS awareness becomes part of the training for indigenous armies and peacekeeping forces, then the problem might be contained to a certain extent. On an optimistic note, the Executive Director of UNAIDS, Dr Peter Piot, has observed that 'a military and police force, well trained in HIV prevention and behaviour changes, can be a tremendous force for prevention if it is made one of their priorities'. Given the scale of underdevelopment and the potential for future conflict and the mass movement of displaced people in the developing world, though, the conditions remain ripe for the spread of HIV/AIDS, and the challenges remain immense.

Roxanne Bazergan
Research Officer and Editor of the Bulletin

A NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW elaborates a country's security policy within the context of its national development goals. The objective is to set out a clear vision for modernising the security forces, which will enable a country to counter more effectively its security threats. Such reviews typically combine a 'threat assessment' with consideration of the possible options for confronting dangers and of the constraints. Proposed reforms must be consistent with available resources, other sectoral policies, and a nation's institutional capacity.

As the concept of national security has broadened over the past decade, threat assessments have moved away from a narrow focus on external military dangers – defence of national territory – to include a wide range of internal, non-military risks to stability and security. These broader 'strategic' threat assessments encompass factors like poverty, food insecurity, communal tensions, and the spread of diseases, such as HIV and malaria. All these elements have the potential to undermine social and political stability, and, as a result, demand national political attention.

The threats to security and political stability are particularly multifaceted in poorer nations, especially those emerging from a protracted armed conflict. A security assessment should also take into account regional and global dynamics and seek to understand where a series of dangers might converge. For example: the impact of refugee flows on areas that cannot sustain the population; or the combined effect of a poor harvest, low residual food stocks, and a downturn in the economy, which could create a state of insecurity that might be exploited by an insurgent group.

In Rwanda, there is an especially urgent need to incorporate issues of justice and reconciliation and the rebuilding of national economic infrastructure into the national security review.

operational focus

National Security Reviews

In South Asia, there are pressing security concerns of a demographic and developmental nature. These include communal tensions, flows of displaced people within and across borders, and a range of environmental stresses, stemming from increased competition for scarce land and resources. Such issues must be addressed alongside the political tensions that remain acute in the region.

Cambodia's defence white paper – *Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia 2000: Security and Development* – was conditioned by 30 years of war and nine years of fragile democratic transition. Its defence policy considers five main factors, encompassing not only military activity, but also economic, demographic, geographic and environmental matters. Cambodia predicts that it is unlikely to face an external military threat in the foreseeable future, but there are serious concerns about the other areas that could contribute to an unruly domestic security environment.

The rationale for a broader threat assessment is that governments must make choices between competing demands on resources. While protecting a state and its citizens from physical dangers of both an internal and external nature still ranks as a very high priority, long-term social problems cannot be neglected. The new stress on developmental issues also means that more government departments –

operational focus

continued

beyond a ministry of defence – need to be involved in a national security review. South Africa's 1996 *White Paper on National Defence* underlines that 'the responsibility for ensuring the security of South Africa's people is now shared by many government departments'.

Risk management and contingency planning and safeguards are the essence of effective government. But the very countries that most need to develop such strategies often lack the resources to do so. This may mean that states

are reduced more to managing crises, than responding to their underlying causes. Moreover, developing countries tend to have little influence over international policies that may impact on their own security and development.

A national security review, therefore, needs to outline realistically the possible proactive and reactive responses to security problems, taking into account the limitations of budgets and human capacity. Once these options have been specified, then governments must begin the difficult political task of deciding how best to allocate their scarce resources.

Col. Phil Wilkinson, Senior Research Fellow

policy brief

AFGHANISTAN'S TALIBAN REGIME has a volatile relationship with the Western aid community, which it sees as representing 'non-Islamic' values. Moreover, humanitarian assistance is a low priority on the movement's agenda – it is more concerned with occupying the rest of the country. But it does require assistance to develop national infrastructure. The international community has withheld such aid because of the Taliban's dire human-rights record. Only two countries, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, officially recognise it as being the legitimate government.

All donors channel humanitarian aid through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) so as to avoid maintaining a permanent presence in Afghanistan. The principle donors include the European Union (EU) and the US, although Norway and Sweden have also been engaged in humanitarian initiatives in the country since the mid-1980s. In 1999, the US donated \$70 million to Afghanistan, while supporting UN

sanctions that prohibit flights by the national airline and freeze the movement's foreign-held financial assets, pending the extradition of the Saudi 'businessman', Osama bin Laden.

For its part, the EU is the largest multilateral donor and has no specific political relationship with Afghanistan. During 1999, it pledged over \$40m dollars in humanitarian aid. The EU contemplated suspending its funding altogether in July 1999, after the Taliban ordered NGOs on EU contracts to relocate to damaged buildings outside the capital, Kabul.

Humanitarian-aid programmes have suffered numerous interruptions over the past couple of years. Negotiations between Norway and the Taliban to construct schools, for example, were set back by US missile attacks in August 1998. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which has worked in Afghanistan since 1989, withdrew after the assault, and did not return until March 1999. To make matters worse, the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan is cutting its operations by 50%, owing to a significant shortfall in funding due to donor fatigue.

Thomas Withington, Research Assistant

Civil oversight of the security forces

ENSURING THAT SECURITY FORCES are democratically accountable and transparent requires effective civil oversight mechanisms. Ideally, each branch of the security services should be overseen by a parliamentary committee or an equivalent, and should be subject to scrutiny by a public accounts body – oversight can be exercised through, *inter alia*, budgetary controls and policy frameworks. A variety of other actors are also involved, including civilian review boards for the police, human-rights ombudsmen, and civil-society ‘watchdog’ groups, namely the media, research institutes, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for how civil oversight should be conducted, but each component can make an important contribution to managing the security forces, thereby helping to guarantee citizens’ rights and liberties. Civil society can act as a vital interface between a state’s security forces and a generally suspicious population.

The degree of civil oversight is often a reflection of the strength of a democratic system. However, even in mature democracies ensuring that oversight mechanisms work effectively remains a constant challenge. Governments tend to try to increase their power *vis-à-vis* parliament and to avoid detailed scrutiny wherever possible. And the security services can be particularly deft at side-stepping probes into their activities.

Although civil control is essential for a healthy democracy, it is not in itself an automatic guarantee against corruption and bad governance. The quality of control is crucial: oversight bodies may have their own agenda or they may simply be inadequate due to a lack of funding or poor management.

The international donor community often views implementation of civil oversight as a benchmark for democratic progress, and it is increasingly tying the provision of assistance to the extent of civil oversight over the security forces. But fragile states, by definition, frequently lack the human resources, institutional mechanisms and expertise necessary to scrutinise properly (if at all) security services. In some instances, a cultural shift may be required, too – which takes time. The task is all the more daunting if the state has been involved in human-rights abuses and if its civil society has been vitiated.

States in transition

It is particularly difficult to establish accountability, transparency, and civil control in war-torn societies and in states in transition. The continued susceptibility of some developing countries to weak, undemocratic government or to military rule often creates a fragile and tense relationship between the security apparatus and civilian power structures. In Ghana, for example, relations between the security services – primarily the armed forces – and parliament and civil society were strained even before the military coups of 1979 and 1981. Thereafter, civil management and accountability of the security services have been persistently undermined.

In late 2000, the country will undergo an important democratic transition, when President Jerry Rawlings – a former flight lieutenant in the national air force – is expected to step down after elections. At an African Security

Dialogue and Research (ASDR) Ghana–South Africa Roundtable on Democratisation and Security–Sector Reform in June 2000, Rawlings’ possible successor, Vice-President John Atta Mills, spoke positively about civil oversight as a cornerstone for creating democratic security forces. The ASDR forum marked the first meeting between military and parliamentary figures in an open setting, and was a bold attempt to include security issues in democratic discourse.

If civil power structures are not operating effectively then the military or police, for example, are more likely to act autonomously, claiming, perhaps, to be protecting democracy in the process

In southern Africa, considerable progress has been made in improving the capacity of civil-society organisations to understand defence management. In 1999, the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM) was set up, involving Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. An advisory board comprises all Southern African Development Community member states, as well as non-state representatives. It is hoped that SADSEM will help:

- to improve civil–military relations and defence management;
- to bolster the development of appropriate governance institutions and mechanisms; and
- to consolidate peace and security, not only within societies, but also between states in the southern African region.

Parliamentary oversight

Secrecy, under the guise of national security, is the foremost stumbling block to effective oversight in many developed and developing countries. Governments often find ways to restrict access to defence and intelligence information. There are legitimate reasons why some security data should remain confidential, but oversight mechanisms become ineffectual if critical information is denied because of a secrecy clause.

Parliaments must establish new laws, or rigorously uphold existing legislation, that prevents excessive secrecy and guarantees the public’s right to information on defence and security matters. The challenge is to strike a balance between the ‘right to know’ and the need for confidentiality.

Well-functioning oversight mechanisms can, in fact, promote the interests of the security forces, and, in some cases, protect it from the vagaries of party politics. Oversight bodies can act as intermediaries between the security services and the executive, and as interlocutors with the public, breaking down some barriers of mutual mistrust. But it is important that civil bodies engage with security forces, requiring a broader appreciation of how the executive, parliament and judiciary affect the functioning of security services. If civil power structures are not operating effectively then the military or police, for example, are more likely to act autonomously, claiming, perhaps, to be protecting democracy in the process.

Civilian authorities in both developed and developing countries can also undermine

principles of civil oversight. Moreover, internal party discipline and patronage can be an obstacle to effective parliamentary scrutiny: parliamentarians may be reluctant to investigate – at least with sufficient vigour – issues that might cause political problems for their respective party leaders.

In Nigeria, prior to the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in May 1999, the National Assembly's various committees were moribund. Legislative oversight that, in theory, existed under the First (1960–66) and Second (1979–83) Republics was undermined not only by successive military regimes, but also by civilian-led administrations. This highlights the fact that civilian-led administrations do not necessarily ensure proper civil oversight. The principles of transparency, accountability, and civil control need to be legally institutionalised and applied if effective democratic control of the security forces is to be achieved.

Improving civil oversight

There are a number of major challenges to improving civil oversight.

- Ministerial and independent bodies need to be established to review security matters and to evaluate and monitor security forces. Security activities covered by secrecy clauses should be open to scrutiny by an independent committee or by an accounts/audit body that has been granted security clearance.
- Key oversight institutions – including parliamentary committees, budget and audit units, the offices of an independent ombudsman, and civil society – must be strengthened. National parliaments need to make use of competent external civilian organisations when scrutinising the activities of the security forces.
- Societies that are trying to consolidate democratic gains through tighter civil control need greater institutional dialogue between and within the various government ministries and

agencies, as well as between parliament and the security services.

- Civilian leaders who control the military must be held to account by parliament in particular and by civil society in general. Transparency and accountability should apply both to the armed forces and to civilian leaders.
- Finally, grounding in security issues remains critical to monitoring the security apparatus. Training for relevant civilians, especially parliamentarians, should focus on analysing security expenditure, oversight of security-related budgets, defence planning, management and procurement, military law and doctrine, prison and judicial procedures, and the administration of justice and police codes of conduct.

Conclusion

Civil oversight mechanisms are vital to the establishment of an effective security sector with a clearly defined mandate and set of responsibilities. Such oversight helps to foster good governance and, ultimately, creates a more secure environment and stable relationship between citizens and the security forces.

As stressed above, however, for civil oversight to become a functioning reality the principles of accountability, civil control, and transparency must be enshrined in legal and practical terms. Otherwise, good governance of the security sector becomes extremely difficult to achieve, and the potential ramifications are all too familiar in the developing world.

Dr Comfort Ero, Research Fellow

More information is available in *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in the Commonwealth*. This report is based on a meeting that was convened by the Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit in March 2000. The CPSU can be contacted by phone on +44 (0)20 7862 8844 or by e-mail at ics@sas.ac.uk.

time line

21 September 2000

British-Angola Forum Seminar: The Media in Angola. Chatham House, London, UK.

Discussion led by Anna Richardson, correspondent in Angola (1997–2000) for the BBC, Reuters, *The Economist* and *The Independent*. E-mail Teresa.BAF@riia.org.

26 September 2000

Contemporary Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Issues. Organised by the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department of the UK Department for International Development. Debates on funding UN humanitarian agencies and on the link between conflict and development. By invitation only.

2–27 October 2000

Transforming Civil Conflict. Online course offered by the European Network University. Joint initiative of the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and the Centre for Conflict Resolution at Bradford University, UK. Designed to give participants insight into conflict processes and the roles of different organisations. For more details, e-mail Lambrecht Wessels at tcc@netuni.uva.nl or see www.netuni.nl/demos/tcc.

20 October 2000

EU Charter on Human Rights. King's College London. Half-day seminar will include speakers from King's College and the legal profession. E-mail the Centre of European Law at cel@kcl.ac.uk or call +44 (0)20 7848 2387.

21 October 2000

Conflict, Violence and the Arms Trade. Organised by the UN Association. Contact the Maidstone branch on +44 (0)1622 746101.

web watch

www.coexistence.net/resource_centre

The Coexistence Resource Centre

Designed to aid the practitioner, academic, policymaker or activist in identifying relevant resources. The site includes international events, newsletters/journals/online libraries and practical resources, such as manuals.

www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/defhome

UK House of Commons Defence Select Committee

Includes reports on the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and provides an example of UK civil oversight procedure.

www.senate.gov/~foreign/hearings/hr072000a.html

The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation?

US Congressional report from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate's hearing on relations with Afghanistan.

www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/hhrraa/aids_briefs/military.htm

Military Populations

Comprehensive paper by the Civil–Military Alliance to Combat HIV and AIDS.

www.unaids.org

Joint UN programme on HIV/AIDS

Key source of information, see, in particular, *AIDS and the Military (best practice – points of view)*. Also includes responses by other sectors, such as:

- agriculture;
- prisons;
- religious; and
- business.

Chris Smith completed papers for the UK Department for International Development (DFID) on the relationship between arms and underdevelopment and on its forthcoming research and information network. This initiative is based on the commitment made by the UK Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, in February 2000. Chris has also been editing the security-sector-assistance guidelines, which should be published by the end of 2000.

Colonel Phil Wilkinson continued to engage with the government of Rwanda, as part of the threat-assessment and security-policy-development project. He wrote military sections for the aforementioned guidelines. Phil expects shortly to start work on a defence policy formulation, evaluation, and implementation paper.

Nici Dahrendorf submitted her multidisciplinary team's *Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security-Sector Reform for East Timor* to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in East Timor, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and to the head of the East Timorese National Resistance Movement, Xanana Gusmão. The report was well received and many of its recommendations are already being implemented. Nici is continuing her research on trafficking in women and children, and is preparing for a field trip to

<http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk>

THE CSDG WEBSITE went live on 11 September 2000. It contains in-depth information on the Group's publications, projects, research and staff. Copies of the *Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security-Sector Reform for East Timor* will be posted on the site, and details on the follow-up to the report and other CSDG activities will be uploaded regularly.

Southeast Asia in mid-October. She is also working on papers looking at HIV/AIDS and human rights, and the gaps in judicial and security-sector reform in countries emerging from conflict.

Comfort Ero traveled to Mali with DFID representatives to monitor progress of the Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) and the West Africa small-arms moratorium. Along with Dylan Hendrickson, she attended the Wilton Park Conference on the Challenges for Governance in Africa. She continued to work on small arms with Roxanne Bazergan, focussing on the UN conference in 2001, and has been involved with the drafting of the security-sector-assistance guidelines. Comfort spent two weeks in Sierra Leone in August, participating in the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) Higher Defence Management Briefing, which focused on the higher management of defence in a democratic society based on the rule of law and civil control. She led a discussion on Approaches to Organising Security Forces, and took part in a panel briefing on security-sector reform and the role of civil society, the judiciary, local government, and the media. She also met with the UK International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT), civil-society groups, senior officers from the Sierra Leone army, and officials from the British High Commission.

Dylan Hendrickson has been working on the security-sector-assistance guidelines and a study on off-budget military expenditure. He gave a talk on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping at a Foreign and Commonwealth Office-organised seminar in Beijing, China, and participated in the Wilton Park Conference on the Challenges for Governance in Africa. Dylan helped to facilitate discussion on civil-military relations at the BMATT briefing on defence management in Sierra Leone.

Roxanne Bazergan continued her research on the relationship between HIV/AIDS, security and the military, including an opinion piece for the forthcoming *Conflict, Security and Development* journal. She also worked on small-arms briefing papers with Comfort Ero for DFID.

Thomas Withington has been editing book-review articles for *Conflict, Security and Development*, and has started to write an article for the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* on Indo-Israeli diplomatic and military links.

bulletin

is published by

*The Conflict, Security
& Development Group*

at the

Centre for Defence Studies

King's College London

Strand, London WC2R 2LS

United Kingdom

Phone +44 (0)20 7848 2943

Fax +44 (0)20 7848 2748

Website <http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk>

EDITOR **Roxanne Bazergan**

DESIGN AND PRODUCTION **Richard Jones**

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Printed by Albert Stallan

Limited, London

ISSN 1467-8780



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ALL ORDER FORMS SHOULD BE SENT TO Roxanne Bazergan, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS. Alternatively, e-mail your request to roxanne.bazergan@kcl.ac.uk or fax it to +44 (0)20 7848 2748.