

bulletin

*The Conflict, Security
& Development Group*

The UK Department for International Development hosted a successful symposium on 15–17 February on military expenditure and security-sector reform.

Developing countries face complex and urgent security problems. Since the end of the Cold War, the security landscape, especially in Africa, has changed dramatically. Insecurity is now less hinged on the threat of war sparked by ideological or territorial dispute, if it ever was. It is now understood that threats to security stem from a complex mixture of internal political problems, institutional weaknesses, and national and regional conflicts. Adding to these pressures are development failures that have exacerbated

food insecurity, increased environmental vulnerability and diminished health provisions.

Traditionally, military expenditure in developing countries has been seen almost exclusively in terms of how much is spent on defence. It has been assumed – although not conclusively proved – that relatively high levels of defence expenditure have a negative impact on development. This assumption was based on the common-sense equation that the more a country devotes to the security sector, the less it has available for public-sector development, especially in health, education and welfare. It followed that, if arms procurement could be intrinsically linked to underdevelopment, so the obverse would be true, and in the 1960s the UN adopted the cause of linking disarmament and development.

What has been missing is an appreciation of the legitimate function of the security sector. The role of the armed forces

Also in this issue Dr Malcolm Chalmers and Elizabeth Clegg on UK arms export licensing ... *Policy Brief* by Dr Robin Poulton on the West Africa Moratorium ... *Operational Focus* by Nici Dahrendorf on Rwanda ... plus regular features *Web Watch*, *Timeline*, *Update* and *Pointers*



The UK Secretary of State for International Development, Rt. Hon. Clare Short, MP, encourages a spirit of partnership, surrounded by senior officials from (left to right) Sweden, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Bangladesh and El Salvador.

has tended to be overlooked, and instead the focus has largely been on the excessive resources that they have consumed, as well as certain behaviour patterns, especially towards their own civilian populations.

This attitude has now changed, and the international community has begun to recognise that the security sector must be placed high on the list of development concerns.

It is self-evident that a government must provide resources for the security sector, with defence expenditure usually taking the largest share. The major challenge, however, is to make sure that the resources devoted to defence are in line both with a broadly agreed understanding of external threats to a state, and with its economic circumstances.

It is very difficult to judge the level of resources required to guarantee national security: if it is over-estimated, development could suffer as precious financial resources go to waste. If it is under-estimated, security could be at risk.

Optimal levels of military expenditure are most likely to result from consultation and evaluation. If donors merely apply pressure on governments to reduce the

amount that they spend on defence, it is more than likely that outlays will be hidden. Governments that wish to project a false level of defence expenditure can easily do so by placing significant amounts off-budget, thereby concealing the real degree of spending. For instance, the payment of debt incurred by the purchase of military *matériel* may not appear in the defence budget but under 'debt repayment'. Governments can also get funding from extra-budgetary sources such as the sale of primary commodities or revenue from private enterprises.

The DFID conference confronted these complex issues and examined how decisions regarding levels of military expenditure are reached and how these decision-making processes can be reviewed and improved.

A full report from the symposium will be published later in the spring. Some of the key issues discussed include:

Fluid political and security context

Definitions of security are changing. Developing countries need help in facing diverse security challenges. These range from basic

policing and core defence requirements, to the fight against terrorism, border control, natural resource protection and combating illicit international trafficking. Civil–military relations are also in a state of transition in many states. The armed forces are often diverted to non-military functions because of the institutional weaknesses or under-funding of essential public services.

Mainstreaming security-sector issues in development policy

There was a general consensus that good governance and public-sector-expenditure management in all countries should include the security sector, even if the precise extent to which the security sector can be treated the same way as other public sectors was a matter of debate.

Photo: Terry Chambers



Senior Research Fellow Susan Woodward briefs delegates from Senegal, Bangladesh and Uganda

Process

A focus on the process by which defence budgets are arrived at, rather than just on the level of defence spending, is likely to be more effective in reducing military expenditure in the long term. This approach centres attention on the institutional framework required for both managing trade-offs between different sectors and for the effective management of the resources devoted to the defence sector.

Partnership

Security-sector-reform and military-expenditure issues should be treated on a partnership basis. Donors and recipient states must recognise the developmental importance and legitimacy of these questions, and commit themselves to improved dialogue and sustained joint effort to address them.

Donor co-ordination

The international community has a responsibility to improve co-ordination and consistency in its approach to security-sector reform, both between, and within, donor governments.

Informed debate

Both donors and partner countries need to invest in deepening and widening their understanding of security-sector problems and the possible responses. In order to encourage informed debate, the capacities of governments, parliaments, civil society and independent research bodies need to be reinforced. Donors should be prepared to establish direct dialogue with security actors on a regular basis.

Domestic ownership

Developing countries need to clarify their own security needs and priorities through national processes of public consultation and security assessments. Building on their diverse involvement in related areas, donors should, in turn, identify what help they can offer on a systematic basis. It was stressed that the product and process of security-sector reform should clearly reflect the national wishes and priorities, so that ‘ownership’ of any reforms rests with the country.

Regional approaches

The regional dimension of security-sector problems, and potential solutions, was strongly underscored throughout the conference. Suggestions were put forward for strengthened co-operation and experience sharing among neighbours, and for constructive input in this area from external partners.

Milestones

A means to evaluate progress is required that establishes clear and realistic benchmarks in order to assess not only the countries undertaking reforms, but also the efforts of donors involved in the security sector.

Conclusion

The symposium contributed to efforts to integrate these difficult and sensitive issues into a framework for promoting co-operation between developing countries and donors. Now, it is important to maintain the momentum. In order to achieve this, governments, institutions, and other committed groups need to work together to build the necessary basis of trust, shared knowledge and realistic policies.

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Dr Chris Smith, Director, Conflict, Security and Development Group

policy brief

On 31 October 1998, the 16 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed a three-year, renewable Moratorium on the Import, Export and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa.

Malian President Alpha Oumar Konaré was the main driving force behind this initiative. The Moratorium, which is a political act of faith and not a legally binding treaty, resulted from his efforts – with the UN – to achieve peace in northern Mali in 1995–96.

It has been a slow process: the time between signature and application was one year, and guidelines for exemption have still to be drawn up. It is unclear under what conditions a member state may purchase ammunition or spare parts. The UN has created a support mechanism, but ECOWAS must build its own capacity in order to make the agreement work. Each aspect of the Moratorium

could be led by one member country – Côte d'Ivoire may accept responsibility for border-control training.

The accord was initiated by the recipient states, but it also hinges on the main supplier countries respecting its provisions. On 3 December 1998, the 33 arms producing and exporting countries in the Wassenaar Arrangement declared their support for the Moratorium. However, most light weapons circulate within the region, and imports come from unauthorised sources in countries such as Bulgaria and Ukraine.

Are some signatories ignoring the spirit of the agreement? For example, when fighting resumed in Sierra Leone in January 1999, both Burkina Faso and Liberia allegedly supplied weapons to the rebels. But the Moratorium is a unique confidence-building initiative, and merits the backing of the international community.

Dr Robin Poulton
Senior Researcher, UN Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

operational focus

Memorandum of Understanding

On 12 April 1999, Rwanda and the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) setting out the basis for a ten-year development partnership. The purpose is to support elements of Rwanda's National Development Vision 2020. Rwandan commitments involve addressing: national unity and reconciliation; good governance; national and regional conflict resolution; social and juridical problems, stemming from the genocide; poverty reduction; development of macroeconomic policies; and institutional and human-resource development. Based on their progress, the UK will provide flexible support for recurrent budgetary expenditures, which will be reviewed at annual bilateral aid talks, tentatively scheduled to begin in April.

This MOU has pros and cons. On the positive side it is a unique instrument in bi-lateral donor relations with Rwanda. No other donor has such an agreement; some (European) donors have expressed an interest in developing a similar arrangement, or partaking in an evaluation process.

On a more critical note, Rwandan commitments both encompass too broad a range of issues, and sectors where there is no discernible government policy as yet. The challenges for the UK are to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality, to ensure that coherent policies are formulated, and to guarantee that the broadest possible section of the Rwandan population is informed and included in the consultation process.

Uncomfortable questions need to be asked, which donors have so far been reluctant to address, such as, how is the war in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo really financed? What is the role of the army in maintaining internal security? When will a credible civil society and a viable opposition to the Government be allowed to exist unimpeded?

Rwanda's political map is complex.

Once named the 'Switzerland of Africa' with its tight social conventions and rigid social hierarchy, the country became notorious for the state-sponsored killings of 1994, primarily of the ethnic Tutsi minority. By the end of 1994, nearly one million people had been killed, two million refugees had fled to neighbouring countries, and a further one million had been internally displaced. Over half of the pre-war population had been affected.

The international community's omission to prevent the genocide led to a guilty reflex, with large amounts of uncoordinated aid – an estimated five billion dollars to date – being poured into post-war Rwanda. A web of disparate development projects has spread throughout the country.

The Rwandan Government exerts tight control over where donor money is channelled, and over its own population. One example is the complex 'villagisation' policy – a land-reform measure that has proved to be a major failure in other parts of Africa. International donors have provided materials and financial support, effectively assisting the Government with the involuntary resettlement of the population.

For the MOU to be credible, it is essential: to engage other donors in an independent monitoring of Rwanda's commitments; to impose conditions and to ask questions. For example, with regard to

operational focus

continued

statistics on demobilisation; to be realistic about Rwanda's priorities and to take account of the regional context. Rwanda is a fragile country surrounded by fragile countries. It will be less prepared to put effort into the 'softer' aspects of the MOU, such as good governance or judicial reform, since its core concerns are internal and external security.

The MoU must also encourage the growth of a broad based 'civil society'; spur the development of an independent judiciary; address off-budget military expenditure; and tackle the ethnic question. Not all Hutus were involved in the genocide, but moderate Hutus suffer discrimination. However, they could and

should play an important role in the reconciliation process.

The UK has to be prepared to withdraw its funding if targets are not met. Together with other bilateral and multi-lateral donors, the UK needs to ensure that a proper policy process is developed.

Rwanda needs a careful mixture of humanitarian and development actions, requiring more political courage and less money. International co-ordination, management and disbursement of funds and resources demand greater consideration, and more questions need to be asked. Guilty reflexes and tacit acceptance of the status quo do not make for effective policy.

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Nici Dahrendorf, Senior Research Fellow
(Social Development)

pointers

► After some 15 years of allegations regarding corruption and several major arms deals, the Indian Government has decided to act. In order to supplement the ineffective workings of the Public Accounts Committee, the Central Vigilance Committee and the Controller and Auditor General will undertake a mandatory time-bound audit prior to any major procurement agreement. India is to increase its defence spending by up to 20% for long awaited and outstanding items.

► The European Union's Stability Pact for south-eastern Europe will hold its first financing conference on 29-30 March to obtain pledges for projects in

the region. Projects have been identified as democratisation and human rights, economic reconstruction, and security.

► Having lost the February referendum on reform of the Zimbabwe Constitution, 76-year-old President Robert Mugabe and his ruling ZANU-PF Party face further challenges at the ballot box. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for mid-March/early April 2000. ZANU-PF currently control 148 of the 150 seats in Parliament. If the February referendum had been an election, they would have lost 58 of those seats.

Regional analysts expect ZANU-PF to win the poll in the spring, but it will be a bruising encounter against opposition groups that are capitalising on poor economic indicators, low living standards and fuel shortages. Party members have called for Mugabe to stand down ahead of presidential elections in 2002, fearing that ZANU-PF might suffer a heavy defeat in the forthcoming polls.

Arms export licensing

In July 1998, the European Union (EU) agreed on a voluntary Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Criterion 8 takes into account the need for the 'compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country ... (who should) ... achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources'. It also suggests that member states consider whether 'the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country'.

The UK licensing system

As a major provider of development finance, both bilaterally and through multilateral organisations, the UK has a particular interest in the damaging economic effects of excessive military spending in developing countries. UK export license applications are considered through an inter-departmental process administered by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and involving the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MoD) and, since mid-1997, the Department for International Development (DFID). Although it is entitled to see any licence applications, DFID has asked to see automatically applications from 83 poor

states, and maintains a list of 42 other countries of interest whose applications it would like to view on request. Between May 1997 and December 1998, DFID initially raised objections to 17 licence applications, with potential recipients including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Philippines, Rwanda and Uganda. Most of these licences were subsequently refused or withdrawn, although the reasoning behind licensing decisions is not made public.

So far DFID has had only a limited impact on the licensing process. The Department has sometimes expressed concern that certain applications might breach the Government's ethical commitment not to export arms which 'might be used' for internal repression or external aggression. But these objections have tended only to reinforce arguments already presented by the FCO, whose mission is 'to promote the national interests of the UK and to contribute to a stronger world community', rather than add a new dimension to them. DFID's distinct role in the process lies in its interpretation of development criterion, which is not effectively covered by any other department involved.

Applying the development criterion

Determining the 'legitimate' security and defence needs of a state – as stipulated in the EU Code of Conduct – is not a straightforward task. Requirements for military forces vary enormously depending on the circumstances facing a particular government. In some cases, even if defence spending is already below regional or international averages, the lack of an external threat may mean that there is scope to make reductions. In others, the main problem may be a misallocation of defence resources rather than excessive defence spending *per se*. A key problem with trying to monitor all aspects of the arms-export

process is that DFID could find itself 'micro-managing' the defence policies of developing states. One way around this issue might be to focus on those cases where arms purchases are substantially reducing the resources available for development purposes.

However, the UK policy of considering each licence application separately, on its own merits, makes it more difficult to assess whether proposed arms exports might have a 'substantial' impact on development. Interpreted strictly, the 'case-by-case' rule means that officials cannot take into account the total cost of a specific equipment programme, but only that part covered by a particular licence. If separate applications were made for air frames, engines and missiles, for example, the collective impact could not be considered. An intelligent exporting company can always evade the development criterion simply by subdividing its licence applications.

Nonetheless, it is still important for DFID to monitor the cumulative level of licences, and of actual exports, to individual states. Transfers from other arms exporters also need to be considered. Although one should not under-estimate the difficulties associated with obtaining information from other exporters, DFID can make use of the EU arms-export working group, COARM, and the newly established EU-US working group of officials. Relevant information can then be included in the Department's licensing advice and multilateral discussions.

The principal of monitoring cumulative levels of exports is incorporated into the Wassenaar Arrangement of July 1996. Under the terms of this agreement, the UK and

other supplier states have agreed information exchanges in order to prevent the 'destabilising accumulations' of conventional weapons.

Attention should probably centre on those states that rely on high levels of external financial assistance, whether from the UK or other donors. In addition to most developing countries, this might include some of the states of southern and eastern Europe, some of which are likely to figure among the largest recipients of UK aid – via the EU budget – over the next decade.

Another possibility that could be considered is a focus on applications above a minimum value threshold. The size of a country's economy would need to be factored in – a one million pound export

to a country with an annual government budget of only £100 million (as is the case in some sub-Saharan African states) would clearly be more significant than a similar export to a larger country.

... the UK should consider pressing other exporting states to follow its lead.

Possible ways forward.

On 11 January Chancellor Gordon Brown announced that the UK is to ban indefinitely export credit guarantees for arms exports to 63 of the world's poor countries. The ban includes the 41 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries already covered by a temporary two-year ban, but has been extended to include a further 22 states which can only borrow from the World Bank on concessional International Development Association (IDA) terms.

The Chancellor based his decision on the need to ensure that resources provided by aid and debt relief are used for poverty relief and not for military spending.

This policy should be extended to a 'presumption of denial' (above certain value thresholds) for all arms exports to these 63 countries, with licences only to be granted if there is clear evidence of a legitimate security requirement. As with the decision on export credits, the UK should consider pressing other exporting states to follow its lead. To make UK policy more coherent it would make sense if the export credit ban, together with the suggested presumption of denial mentioned above, was widened to cover the remaining 15 IDA recipients, including India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Nigeria.

It is far from clear, for example, why export credit guarantees should no longer be available to countries such as Ghana and Sri Lanka, but are offered to Zimbabwe and Pakistan – countries with lower levels of per capita Gross National Product (GNP).

Some of the most important discussions between the Government and prospective export companies take place prior to an actual application for a licence. DFID should be part of the decision-making process, ensuring that it has more formal engagement in matters like the granting of F680 licences, which allow trial samples of British-made arms to be sent to foreign customers.

Greater public availability of information on licensing decisions, combined with the active interest of members of parliament and non-governmental organisations, can play an important role in mobilising support for improvements in export controls. The publication in March 1999 of the first UK annual report on strategic exports was a major step forward. It would be useful if future

reports included data on the value of licences granted, including annual country totals. This would not significantly affect commercial confidentiality.

Over time, DFID will strengthen its capacity to assess the adequacy and appropriateness of security-sector spending, making it better placed for constructive dialogue with aid recipients on the potential development costs of inappropriate spending on arms. Expressions of donor concern can help to strengthen those in government and civil society who are seeking to reorient national budgets towards more pressing priority areas. Consideration of the development criterion in export licensing reinforces these efforts, particularly in countries that have made little progress on security-sector reform.

Conclusion

If debt relief and aid are to bolster development efforts, it is vital that the resources saved are used for poverty reduction. As both a significant donor and a major arms supplier, the UK has a particular responsibility to ensure that resources provided for development are not squandered on unnecessary military spending. DFID is certainly aware of the obstacles it faces and is taking active steps to increase its capacity to work more effectively in this area.

The Government has made a commitment to include development criteria in its licensing policy, and the involvement of DFID in the process is evidence of its serious intent to do so. If fine intentions are to be translated into effective practice, however, substantial changes in practice will be necessary, both at the national and multilateral levels.

Dr Malcolm Chalmers is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. **Elizabeth Clegg** is Joint Co-ordinator of Saferworld's Arms Trade Programme.

time *line*

10–12 March 2000 Euro-conference on Women, Violence and Reconciliation.

(Dublin, Ireland)

Contact Dr Maryann Valiulis

E-mail wscentre@tcd.ie

24–26 March 2000 Monitoring and Verification of Peace Agreements.

(Wilton Park, UK)

Organised with the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC).

Contact Heather Ingrey:

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E-mail heather.ingrey@wiltonpark.org.uk

28–29 March 2000 Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Commonwealth Countries.

(London, UK) Invitees only.

24–28 April 2000 Just Peace: Peace-Making and Peace-Building for the New Millennium.

(Auckland, New Zealand)

The Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee.

Contact the Congress Secretariat:

Phone + 64 9 529 4144

E-mail christinep@cmsl.co.nz

24–29 April 2000 Focus 2000: Peace Support Operations Seminar.

(Sandhurst, UK)

Hosted by the British army for the armed forces in the ABCA nations – America, Britain, Canada and Australia. New Zealand has observer status. Representatives from government ministries and major non-governmental organisations have also been invited.

web *watch*

www.unog.ch/unidir

UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Current activities include:

- Peace-building and Practical Disarmament in West Africa. Stimulating national research;
- The Geneva Forum. Occasional seminars on contemporary issues in arms control and disarmament; and
- UNIDIR Handbook on Arms Control.

www.oneworld.org/globalwitness Global Witness

Research to brief governments, inter-government organisations, non-governmental organisations and the media on areas where profits from environmental exploitation fund human-rights abuses.

Reports include:

- 'A Crude Awakening': the Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets.
- 'A Rough Trade': the Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict.

<http://magnet.undp.org>

UN Development Programme (UNDP) Management and Governance Network

Reports include:

- Human Rights and Sustainable Human Development;
- UNDP and Governance: Experiences and Lessons Learned; and
- Legislatures and Good Governance. This has a useful 'Governance Link' directory.

The editor does not accept responsibility for the content of any of the websites listed.

Colonel Philip Wilkinson (OBE) joined the Group as a Senior Research Fellow in January, after 32-years service with the British army. He has ten years operational experience. Since 1993 Philip has been responsible for developing and writing Peace Support and Civil Military Operations doctrine for the UK and NATO, and has written extensively on civil–military relations. He was part of the UK’s strategic planning group for operations in Kosovo, and was the Assistant Director for Peace Support Operations at the new Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. He was awarded an MBE in 1982 and an OBE in 1998.

Dr Chris Smith wrote an article on the prospects for a successful UN 2001 conference on small arms for UN Institute for Disarmament Research’s *Disarmament Forum*. He chaired a seminar at Chatham House, and the launch, at King’s College, of Dr George Perkovich’s book, *India’s Nuclear Bomb*. Chris gave two radio interviews, on Pakistan and Afghanistan, and briefings to International Alert and the press on security-sector reform.

Dr Susan Woodward presented a paper at a conference on Kosovo’s final status, sponsored by the UN Association (US) and chaired by Lord Owen. She participated at a London School of Economics seminar on the Balkans, and was a panellist at a conference in Paris on ‘Assessing South-Eastern Europe: Developments and Prospects.’ Susan gave oral testimony before a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee on Kosovo, and spoke at a US Army Senior Officers’ seminar on the history of the conflict. She carried out research for a strategic, conflict-impact assessment in Moldova, and was a member of a planning meeting for a new US Social Science Research Council initiative on ‘Global Security and Cooperation’.

Nici Dahrendorf contributed to a proposal for monitoring the UK–Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding, and gave a seminar at Cambridge University on humanitarian principles in field operations. Nici is continuing her research on East Timor and Indonesia, and is working on a project examining the trafficking of women and children.

Dr Comfort Ero wrote a security survey of Africa, and gave a presentation at International Alert on good practice in security-sector reform. She attended a conflict-assessment meeting at DFID, and wrote an article on the privatisation of security in Africa for a special edition of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)’s *Conflict Trends*. She also attended a conference on non-state actors at Wilton Park.

Dylan Hendrickson contributed to an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development study on ‘Security-Sector Reform and Development Co-operation,’ and prepared a proposal on developing-country security themes for the Economic and Social Research Council. He also gave a talk with Comfort Ero at DFID on security-sector reform.

Richard Jones was in Washington, DC, commissioning articles and meeting potential review-board members for the forthcoming *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*. He and Roxanne Bazergan also attended a light-weapons conference at Johns Hopkins University. Richard has redesigned the Centre for Defence Studies (CDS)’s publications, produced artwork for the CSDG website, and edited the Group’s second Working Paper on Nigeria and security-sector reform (now available from the CDS).

Thomas Withington organised the book launch of *India’s Nuclear Bomb* and assisted with editing a report on the Indian military.

The Group produced a scoping paper on security-sector reform in Indonesia, and provided background papers and resources for the DFID symposium on ‘Military Expenditure and Security Sector Reform’. Dr Chris Smith summarised the conclusions and recommendations of the conference on the final day.

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