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State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: The Politics of Security Decision-Making

A Comparative Study of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda

SSR Policy Briefing for HMG

CSDG

CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT GROUP

About this Policy Briefing

Security sector reform (SSR) has moved rapidly up the international aid agenda during the past decade. There is growing recognition that SSR is fundamentally a political activity and that this requires a coherent response among development, diplomatic and defence actors.

This comparative study of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda had two aims: firstly, to examine who makes decisions about security, the factors which influence decision-making, and the consequences for the security of people; and secondly, to suggest ways to incorporate such knowledge more effectively into UK SSR programming.

The study was funded by the UK Government's Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools. It was conducted by the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King's College London in partnership with the Centre for Democracy and Development in Nigeria, the Social Scientists' Association in Sri Lanka, and the Centre for Basic Research in Uganda.

The new **Conflict Prevention Pool** (CPP) is the main vehicle for supporting the UK Government's work on SSR. The CPP is managed jointly by the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD).

For further information, contact the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) at DFID on +44 (0)207 023 0767, or email Mark White at m-white@dfid.gov.uk.

The **Conflict, Security and Development Group** is a leading international resource for research, analysis, training and expert policy advice on issues at the intersection of security and development. CSDG was established at King's College London in 1999 with the aim of bridging the academic and policy communities. Its core mandate is to deepen understanding about the development challenges confronting societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and to help translate this knowledge into practical agendas for change at local, national, regional and international levels.

CSDG's **Governance and Security** programme is concerned with how international assistance in the security domain (notably the SSR agenda) can be better tailored to the political context and the needs of aid recipients.

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Acknowledgements

About this Policy Briefing

Security sector reform (SSR) has moved rapidly up the international aid agenda during the past decade. HMG has played a leading role in developing the SSR policy agenda and currently has SSR assistance programmes in a number of countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East.

There is increasing recognition that SSR is a fundamentally political activity. Although defence is often the entry point for external assistance, SSR requires a broad developmental approach. Hence it is hoped that this Policy Briefing will be of interest to the three British international departments, and indeed other donors grappling with the need for a whole-of-government approach.

This comparative study of the politics of security decision-making focused on three countries where HMG currently supports SSR: Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda. The aim of the study was firstly, to enhance understanding about the factors which influence security decision-making processes, and secondly, to explore ways of incorporating this knowledge more effectively into HMG's SSR and broader conflict prevention and development programming.

The research was conducted by the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King's College London, in partnership with research institutions in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda.[1]

This Policy Briefing consists of five sections containing the key project findings:

- **Section 1:** Key findings and policy messages (p. 5)
- **Section 2:** Lessons for future SSR research (p. 10)
- **Section 3:** Nigeria policy note (p. 14)
- **Section 4:** Sri Lanka policy note (p. 19)
- **Section 5:** Uganda policy note (p. 24)

For the detailed analysis which underpins this Policy Briefing, see the full reports listed in Annex A (electronic versions can be down-loaded from http://www.ssrnetwork.net/publications/psdm.php). Annex B provides more information on the research institutions involved in the project.

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1   The Centre for Democracy and Development (Nigeria), the Social Scientists' Association (Sri Lanka) and the Centre for Basic Research (Uganda).

Section 1
Key findings and policy messages

Key findings

SSR is a politically sensitive undertaking, significantly more so than in more conventional areas of development assistance, such as health and education. This is because control of the security sector underpins political power in most countries. Politics therefore shapes security decision-making processes and needs to be systematically accounted for in UK SSR programming if such programming is to be effective. This requires a coherent response among development, diplomatic and defence actors.

Where possible, SSR programming should be underpinned by a firm evidence base. Political analysis is often inadequate and limited to the planning stage of UK SSR assistance programmes, rather than integrated throughout the programming cycle. As a consequence, UK assistance is often not sufficiently tailored to the needs, priorities and circumstances facing partner countries, or flexible enough to respond to changes in the political environment.

A key objective of SSR is to support the development of state security institutions that are responsive to the security needs of people. Responsiveness – understood as *the degree to which decision-makers defer to the demands and preferences of the wider community* – is shaped by a number of factors, including citizens' ability to articulate a demand for security, the inclination of policymakers to defer to this, and the capability of state institutions to translate this intent into public policies that enhance security.

The idea of state responsiveness draws from the experience of mature Western democracies in which power and authority are centralized, there is national consensus around the idea of security and safety as a public good, citizens can assert their 'demand' for security through the political process, there are adequate administrative capacities and resources to deliver public services, and the security apparatus is responsive to – but not dominated by – the prevailing political wind.

However, these conditions rarely hold in many of the contexts where SSR is being promoted, which are often conflict-affected, as our three studies show. There are likely to be different sources of security decision-making authority with varying degrees of autonomy from the central state. The state may not be the sole or even principle provider of security services, and a plurality of legal systems may be in place. This suggests that there are real limitations to state-centric approaches to SSR.

Furthermore, the ability of citizens to articulate and exercise a 'demand' for security is influenced by a range of factors, including levels of socioeconomic development, social cohesion

and civil society development, and the maturity of a political system. Where these levels are low, the public articulation of security preferences tends to revolve around narrow, parochial interests, further increasing the autonomy of government security decision-makers.

Donor actors can themselves also have contradictory impacts on responsiveness in the security domain, particularly where their priorities diverge from those of the aid recipient or there is incoherence between economic and security policies. While aid can strengthen government capacity for service delivery, it can also reduce (in cases of 'aid dependency') the need for governments to consult with their citizens about the latter's policy preferences.

The study identifies five key factors that have been important in constraining state responsiveness in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda: political and historical legacies that have shaped the relationship between the security sector and the population; the relative autonomy of policy elites; the crisis-ridden political environment in which decision-making takes place; the prominence of particularistic agendas in the public sector; and critical shortfalls in institutional capacity.

This has a number of implications for UK SSR programming in all three countries, each of which is now at a critical political juncture: Nigeria, due to recent presidential elections; Sri Lanka, because of the dramatic escalation of its civil conflict earlier this year; and Uganda, where recent prospects of a peace settlement in the north of the country, which would give a boost to rehabilitation efforts, have been dampened due to the stalling of the Juba process. *[See the country policy notes for more detail.]*

Regarding these implications, firstly, there must be recognition that in situations of weak state responsiveness, the answer to security problems will not lie in SSR alone. This may require a broader strategy of engagement than the current focus on providing assistance primarily through security sector institutions. Such a strategy would seek to incorporate SSR aims and concerns into wider economic and social development programming, where applicable, and address the political causes of armed conflicts.

Secondly, UK support for SSR must not only be politically sensitive, but also politically engaged. External assistance in the security sector can complicate the security situation, or at the very least arouse suspicion of donor motives. UK assistance that is not sensitive to these factors risks undermining the trust between sovereign nations that must be the foundation for SSR programming.

Thirdly, effective political engagement with SSR requires a coherent use of policy instruments available to HMG (financial assistance, technical assistance, political dialogue, conditionalities, etc.), as well as of departmental resources. Out-sourcing of SSR assistance to consultants and the private sector should be seen as an instrument to enhance rather than a substitute for coherent cross-departmental engagement.

Policy recommendations

1. *Situating SSR assistance within a coherent political framework*

Recommendation 1: *UK support for SSR should be provided within a clear strategic policy framework that spells out what the UK hopes to achieve by assistance in this area, the instru-*

ments and resources that it will draw upon, and the roles and responsibilities of different departments. The current SSR strategy is not binding upon departments, nor does it offer targets for departments to work towards in developing capacity to support SSR. [This is consistent with a recommendation made in the recently completed GCPP Review[2].]

Recommendation 2: *DFID, FCO and MOD desk officers in London, as well as members of the SSDAT and the relevant advisory cadre in the UK missions overseas who have a responsibility for SSR programming, need to ensure that assistance is grounded in a solid political analysis that is regularly updated. FCO has a clear role to play in leading political dialogue around SSR with partner countries; this should be reflected in the job objectives for FCO staff.*

Recommendation 3: *Responsibility for delivering a significant portion of UK assistance for SSR is now out-sourced to the private sector. Consultants also need to demonstrate an understanding of how politics will affect their activities, and this should be reflected in the work plans of consultants and consulting firms to which HMG subcontracts the management of SSR assistance. HMG should push for a set of 'industry' standards that apply to private sector actors working on SSR.*

Recommendation 4: *The merger of the Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools offers an opportunity for cross-regional analysis and learning, as well as the development of a common departmental voice on SSR. The new Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) should not simply be seen as a mechanism for co-ordinating SSR spending, but should also be tasked with assessing the coherence of approaches and the impact of broader policies that may not fall under SSR programming, but can impact upon it (defence relations, counter-terrorism activities, arms sales, etc.). A key aim of the CPP Security and Small Arms Control Strategy should be to add value over and above the activities it funds.*

2. Integrating political analysis into programming

Recommendation 5: *To be effective, SSR country assistance strategies must be context-driven. There should be involvement by local analysts in the various programming stages, including the preliminary assessment phase of an SSR programme, monitoring and evaluations. Programming should be informed by a thorough assessment of all major factors that will affect its outcome.*

Recommendation 6: *Political analysis should be a central component of SSR programming. The timing of analysis should respond not simply to administrative requirements, but should be carried out at strategic programming points. Programming, in turn, should be flexible enough to respond to emerging research, rather than waiting until the next annual review or phase of the programme to incorporate findings.*

Recommendation 7: *Detailed plans for the monitoring and evaluation of SSR programmes, as well as risk identification and management, should be included in SSR programme documents*

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2   N. Ball and L. van de Goor, 'Promoting Conflict Prevention Through Security Sector Reform: Review of Spending on Security Sector Reform Through the Global Conflict Prevention Pool', April 2008. URL: http://www.ssrnetwork.net/

to ensure that adequate provision is made for financing and managing the process. This may help to safeguard research and evaluation activities, particularly if substantive changes to the programme are made after its inception.

Recommendation 8: *Criteria and guidelines for incorporating analysis into SSR programming, determining the nature and level of involvement by local analysts in setting research agendas and evaluating SSR programmes, and establishing and maintaining a programme log on SSR issues should be developed by the Security and Small Arms Control Strategy.*

3. Developing common departmental and donor analytical frameworks

Recommendation 9: *Given that SSR plays a key part in HMG's international assistance programmes, there is a strong case for DFID to designate the specific skill sets and experience required for SSR advisory posts. This would be the best way of ensuring that the right people are selected for the right postings in countries where SSR is being supported. [See the GCPP Review.]*

Recommendation 10: *Joint donor programmes of support for SSR are in most contexts desirable in order to maximize the impact of donor assistance and avoid duplication. The development of common analytical frameworks offers a basis for harmonizing donor views and policy, and should be encouraged by HMG.*

4. Fostering national, research-led debates on SSR

Recommendation 11: *Genuine national ownership of SSR programmes cannot be achieved unless there is meaningful capacity among national stakeholders to analyse and lead the debate on SSR issues.[3] The UK should make it a priority to foster the development of an SSR research community in the countries where it is engaged in supporting SSR. While this aim can be promoted centrally through support for (cross-) regional research initiatives such as the GFN-SSR and the new Global Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST), this should not take the place of nationally targeted support, where there is an entry point and need for this.*

5. Strengthening in-country SSR advisory capacity

Recommendation 12: *HMG should ensure that it has adequate advisory capacity within country offices to manage SSR programmes before it engages. Management should not be seen purely as an administrative task, but also involves SSR expertise, country knowledge, and adequate time and incentives to engage with national SSR actors. Where capacity does not exist, the SSDAT should be capacitated to deal with the political, development and conflict issues that may arise. [See the GCPP Review.]*

Recommendation 13: *The drive to cut administrative costs within the UK's aid programme may make it more difficult for HMG to ensure sufficient, well-trained human resources in its*

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[3]   L. Nathan, 2007. *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform.* Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, University of Birmingham. URL: http://www.ssrnetwork.net/.

overseas SSR programmes. HMG needs to assess how the out-sourcing of SSR programme management to consultancy firms will impact upon overall programme effectiveness and, in particular, the ability to ensure that technical assistance is provided in a politically sensitive manner. ■

Section 2
Lessons for future SSR research

Key messages

Because SSR is a fundamentally political activity, politics needs to be systematically accounted for in UK SSR programming if such programming is to be effective. Development of a firm evidence base to under programming will make it easier to tailor UK assistance to the needs, priorities and circumstances facing partner countries, and to respond to changes in the political environment.

Drawing on the experiences of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda, this study suggests that UK programming in the security sector is based on a relatively weak empirical base, particularly with regard to the politics of reform processes. The problem is not fundamentally one of the poor capacity of advisers or a lack of appreciation of the importance of analysis. The importance of evidence-based programming is understood by those managing SSR engagements in all three countries.

Various factors make it difficult for SSR policy and programme managers to acquire the political analysis they need:

- the long-term nature of academic research;
- the sensitive nature of security issues, which makes research difficult;
- limited capacity within the advisory cadre to conduct analysis or digest research produced by others;
- lack of 'local knowledge' about the contexts where HMG is working; and
- the political imperative to develop programmes before there is adequate understanding of these contexts.

As a consequence, HMG, like other donors, relies heavily on outside sources of analysis to inform programming. In most cases, these are UK-based academic institutions or international consultants from outside the countries where SSR programmes are being established. This makes it difficult to acquire the inside political knowledge required or to involve local analysts in UK programming processes.

The methodology adopted for the present study sought to overcome some of these problems by partnering with local institutions in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda. The aim of a 'partnership-based' approach was not simply to gain a richer analysis of security issues, but to get local researchers more involved in the UK SSR programming cycle, from the stage of agenda-setting through the development, implementation and evaluation stages.

The project proposed an iterative means of conducting research and developing SSR programming. CSDG's partner institutions took the lead in conducting the field research and collating the findings. Preliminary findings were presented to the HMG conflict adviser in each country at various stages over the course of the project, who was given the opportunity to provide feedback and shape the next stage of the research. CSDG in turn took the lead in comparing the country experiences, assessing the policy implications and presenting the final results to the UK government.

Lessons for future research

1. *Partnership-based research and donor SSR programmes*

Lesson 1: *Within the same research project, it may not be possible simultaneously to conduct longer-term empirical research on sensitive security issues, build capacity among local researchers and influence donor policy. This means that policy-relevant research on security issues must set realistic objectives, particularly in difficult situations of conflict or political instability.*

Lesson 2: *For a partnership-based approach to SSR research to work, donor programmes need to be flexible enough to accommodate research findings. In turn, organizations that are provided with the opportunity to influence donor policy and contractually commit themselves to delivering work need to accept that, in doing so, there is an accompanying level of accountability.*

2. *Developing research agendas and methodologies*

Lesson 3: *Policy-relevant research on SSR must, where possible, involve national researchers from the outset in designing the research project. This will enhance the sense of ownership of research projects and strengthen analytical capacity within partner countries. In the long run, both these aspects will contribute towards generating support for SSR. This is essential for the success of SSR programmes.*

Lesson 4: *The study adopted a methodology based on a set of 'micro'-case studies of critical decision-making events. This turned out to be a successful approach to studying the politics of security decision-making and unpacking its various dimensions. However, this approach could be further improved by the development of a more rigorous method for selecting case studies.*

Lesson 5: *There is currently limited knowledge to draw upon either at the empirical or conceptual level on the politics of security decision-making in developing countries. Some of the studies that have focused on the politics of state formation can be of help in this regard, but to a limited degree. If a conceptual framework were developed on this issue, it would better inform the interpretation of the case study material.*

Lesson 6: *There are likely to be trade-offs in terms of focus within a research project that will affect the nature of its conclusions. Close donor involvement in determining research questions can help to ensure that the findings of a research project are directly relevant to policy concerns and result in practical policy recommendations. However, this may limit the scope for a criti-*

cal evaluation of the assumptions that underpin donor SSR programming. The development of a more independent research agenda will allow for this kind of critical analysis, but may, in turn, make it difficult to translate research findings into practical recommendations that can be used by donors.

3. *Conducting policy-relevant research on sensitive issues*

Lesson 7: *The case study work benefitted from the prior experience of the authors on the subjects that were selected for examination. This contributed to the timely conclusion of the studies and a richer and more nuanced analysis. There were a number of cases where authors did not have substantial prior research experience on security issues. While this in some ways slowed the research process, the final outcome was that the pool of security analysts in each of the three countries was expanded, as was capacity to engage in policy debates on security issues (see Recommendation 11 in Section 1 on building national research capacity).*

Lesson 8: *It is not always necessary to study politically 'hot topics' in order to understand some of the structural features of the security decision-making process. By examining decision-making events from the past, it is possible to overcome some of the sensitivities of research of this nature and come up with policy-relevant findings.*

Lesson 9: *Careful thought must go into planning research on security issues, due both to its sensitivity and data limitations. Because primary, published sources of information on security decision-making are very difficult to get hold of – if they exist at all – researchers must rely much more on interviews and secondary sources of information. This can make it possible to piece together a picture of a decision-making event, but requires adequate time to carry out. Research projects on sensitive security issues may demand a greater focus on primary sources of data, given the lack of published material in this area. Working with primary sources demands more time for making contacts and confidence-building.*

Lesson 10: *Formulating policy recommendations in a research study on security issues is a potentially difficult and sensitive undertaking. This is particularly the case in countries where analysis of security issues by academics is discouraged or where they have limited prior experience in this type of research. This factor should be borne in mind when donors request that the research they commission should be policy-relevant.*

Lesson 11: *Governments and security agencies are still very reluctant to share information on security issues, although the fact is that much of this information can now be found on the Web. However, this can make it more difficult to establish its accuracy or authenticity. It can therefore be in the interests of governments to provide more information on security issues to the public in order to prevent misunderstandings about security policy.*

4. *Feeding research findings into SSR programming*

Lesson 12: *Different kinds of research may be necessary to influence policy. While longer-term academic research can provide a stronger understanding of the context in which SSR is taking place, it may not provide actionable recommendations for programme managers.*

Lesson 13: *In order for country offices to draw maximum benefit from SSR research that has been commissioned from local analysts, SSR project advisers should be actively engaged in managing the research. Regular interaction between researchers and the policy end users provides the latter with a sense of the emerging research findings and an opportunity to clarify in which areas policy guidance can be of help.*

5. *Managing and incentivizing research partners*

Lesson 14: *In managing policy-relevant research, there is a difficult balance to strike between meeting the contractual obligations of the 'customer' and satisfying research partners that they are not simply instruments for carrying out donor policy. This requires that all three partners work closely together in defining the research model that will be adopted.*

Lesson 15: *Academic incentives, such as the possibility of publishing papers and opportunities for pursuing the subject on a long-term basis, can be important motivating factors for researchers. This is particularly the case where financial incentives are limited, making it important that provision for eventual publication of research outputs be made from the outset of projects.* ■

Section 3
Nigeria policy note[4]

Current political context

A change in government following elections, as occurred last year in Nigeria when Obasanjo's close political ally Yar 'Adua came to power, is often seen as a 'critical juncture' which can be exploited to push forward reforms in the security sector. There is no doubt that the new president has some room for manoevre to change established policies, as evidenced by his willingness to cancel a number of key contracts in the oil sector which had been signed by his predecessor. But there is no indication yet that radical reform of security structures and practice is on the cards, not least of all because civil control over the military-dominated Nigerian security establishment has traditionally been weak.

The hand-over of power by Obasanjo to Yar 'Adua in 2007 was the first successful transition of power in Nigeria from one elected government to another. This transition was not completely peaceful, however, taking place as it did against a backdrop of continuing armed activity by militias in the Delta region and a rash of election-related violence at state level. Extensive local-level violence typically accompanies competition for parliamentary seats and governorships in Nigeria, given the huge political and financial prizes at stake. Furthermore, the vote was controversial, with widespread allegations of rigging by the ruling party which raised the spectre of interference in the electoral process by either Obasanjo or the military.

That this did not occur may not so much be an indication that the military has lost its ability or desire to influence politics in Nigeria, as rather that its strategy has changed in the face of general international intolerance of military regimes. Instead, it is likely that the military has negotiated a withdrawal of sorts from engagement in the formal political domain in return for guarantees that will protect its longer-term autonomy and institutional interests. In these circumstances, then, and given the instability that characterizes the Delta region where the bulk of Nigeria's oil production occurs, it is unlikely that SSR (particularly any defence component) will proceed in anything more than an incremental manner. These findings are intended to inform HMG's strategy for any potential future engagement in Nigeria's security sector.

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4   The analysis for this policy note draws on *The Politics of Security Decision-making: Nigeria Country Study* by Okechukwu Ibeanu and Abubakar Momoh (June 2008).

Status of HMG's Security and Justice programme

HMG's security and justice programming in Nigeria is at a turning point. The current Security, Justice and Growth (SJG) programme, launched in 2000, is due to wind up in 2008. SJG consists of a sector-wide approach to justice, policing and penal reform that is being undertaken both at the federal level and in four focal states. Management of this programme is sub-contracted to the British Council. The programme is based on the presumption that a political will for reform exists across the sector. Accordingly, its principal focus has been on supply-side issues in the security sector. The programme's engagement with civil society – to generate popular 'demand' for state-level security services – has been limited.

There have been three main lines of activity in the defence sector supported by the UK Defence Adviser and the Commander of the British Defence Advisory Team (BDAT), Nigeria:

1)   encouraging the Nigerian government (thus far without a positive response) to undertake a defence review which could underpin future high-level governance and management reforms;

2)   maintenance and improvement of relations between the UK MOD and the Nigerian military establishment in order to support the UK's longer-term defence goals in the region and shape the professionalism of the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF); and

3)   peace support operations training.

Leverage and incentives for defence reform along the lines which HMG and other donors would like to see have been difficult to find. An assessment of sustainable achievements to date both in SJG and in the defence arena collectively has not been conducted, and such an evaluation could provide some useful ideas as to how to increase coherence between the two HMG interventions in support of an overall HMG strategy for engagement in this area. It would also play an important role in assessing where HMG should focus follow-on activities.

Key research findings

The Nigeria study on the 'politics of security decision-making' traces historically the emergence, growth and transformation of the national security apparatus in Nigeria. It argues that the failure of central government to provide adequately for the security needs of the public over the years demonstrates the limits of government security provision. This failure has also led to and justified the growing role of non-governmental actors in security provision in Nigeria. The current security duality (governmental/non-governmental) suggests that 'cooperative security', in which both governmental and non-governmental actors have clearly defined legal roles, would strengthen security institutions and provide a democratic framework for better security service delivery in Nigeria.

These propositions are explored in the context of five micro-case studies – the formation of the Bakassi Boys (a vigilante group) in Abia State in the 1990s, the role of Odua'a People's Congress (OPC) in providing security to the local community in Lagos, the formation of

the Hisba Corps (police) in Kano State following implementation of Shari'a law in northern Nigeria, the role of non-governmental forces in the Niger Delta region with respect to community grievances and conflict between different ethnic groups, and the impact of external assistance on national security reform and policy processes as expressed through the contract given to the American private security company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), to professionalize the Nigerian army.

Drawing on these case studies, the study finds that the problems which underpin government security provision in Nigeria, understood in terms of the *incapacity, partiality* and *inaccessibility* of national security structures, have their roots in in a general crisis of governance within Nigeria. This crisis has various dimensions which include economic problems, political authoritarianism and negative communalism.

The study argues that, over the years, the doctrinal basis of security decision-making in Nigeria has been a 'reactive/corrective' perception of security. It responds to security threats and seeks to eliminate such threats and correct the aberrations which generate insecurity. As a result, it is not proactive and does not effectively anticipate the political problems and human vulnerabilities which give rise to insecurity. This explains the government's tendency to repress social discontent rather than to manage it and treat its underlying causes. In the process, this reaction elicits violent resistance from aggrieved sections of the society, such that as seen in the Niger Delta.

Because power in Nigeria tends to be sectional and communal, national security decisions are influenced by sectional and communal, particularly ethno-religious, considerations. As such, national security organs are characterized by ethnicity, nepotism, patronage and corruption. Security decision-making in Nigeria has failed to command the confidence of the entire nation, and many segments of the populace feel excluded. Above all, control of the national security decision-making process is elitist, personalized and presidential. At the same time, it privileges the military over other government agencies.

Perhaps the most important weakness of government security decision-making in Nigeria is that in spite of the elaborate provisions in the Constitution, security decision-making is marked by an essentially ad hoc approach to planning and implementation. It is not shaped by any coherent national security strategy. Rather, it is predominantly fashioned according to the whims and personality of the president, and justified on grounds of efficiency and secrecy.

These tendencies have had far-reaching impacts on security and security decision-making in Nigeria. First, they have resulted in an incapacity of government security agencies to provide adequate security. Second, government security organs have become partial and sectional in providing security. And third, they have made national security decision-making inaccessible to large sections of the populace, leading to very low confidence in the government's ability to protect the people. The net effect of these factors is that security provision in Nigeria has become an issue for political manipulation, it has become increasingly communal rather than public in orientation, and it has become more privatized and personalized. These inadequacies create large security gaps which a range of non-governmental actors and social forces have sought to fill.

In sum, there are a number of key features of the security decision-making environment in Nigeria of which external actors should be aware:

- *Federalism and security decision-making.* The Federal Constitution of Nigeria and years of military rule have led to the centralization of government security decision-making. This has remained a contentious issue as component states of the country have sought greater devolution of security powers. This has become part and parcel of demands by states for 'true federalism', meaning a more balanced allocation of powers and resources between the central and state governments. A major part of this demand has been the call for the establishment of police forces at state level.

- *Politics and security decision-making.* Security decision-making in Nigeria mirrors the general politics of the country. Principally, the politics of communalism, especially in its ethnic and religious forms, is reproduced in the security sphere. A central aspect of this politics is 'marginalization', the Nigerian term for exclusion of one's ethnic, religious and other communal groups from national decision-making. Security decision-making is always viewed by the public through the cipher of this politics of communalism. It is this feeling of communal exclusion from government security provisioning that drives the emergence of non-governmental security actors at the local level.

- *Non-governmental security decision-making.* Powerful centres of security decision-making authority exist in society, with varying degrees of independence/autonomy from the government. These include vigilantes, militias, cults and death squads (professional assassins). These irregular forces have their immediate origin in the general failure of the central and state-level governments to meet public security needs. However, socio-economic conditions and political authoritarianism, particularly military rule, set the broader context for the emergence of these alternative security actors.

- *Relationship between governmental and non-governmental security actors.* This relationship has been one of mutual ambivalence and pragmatism. Government agencies tend to accept and 'adopt' non-governmental security actors when the latter are popular with the public and appear to be delivering security services efficiently. However, government actors always see non-governmental actors as potential threats and so seek to eliminate them. On their part, non-governmental security actors, particularly insurgent groups, are quite adaptive in their relations with the government, moving from underground and anti-government activities to the more legitimate role of security provisioning for their communities,* depending on the level of hostility the government shows towards them.

- *Informalization of security decision-making.* There is a trend towards the informalization of government security decision-making, in which decisions are essentially personalized and taken outside regular institutional mechanisms. Government security decision-making shares this characteristic with security decision-making in the non-governmental sector.

- *Public perception of government and non-governmental security actors.* Nigerians see these sources of security decision-making authority not as competing alternatives, but as complementary. They tend to be pragmatic about security provisioning.

Implications for HMG policy

Nigeria is currently high on the security and development agenda for HMG, particularly DFID. Recent elections and the ensuing change in government have heightened awareness that change is necessary within the security sector. Rapid engagement by HMG in order to be seen to be 'doing something', however, should not outweigh careful analysis about where external assistance can have the most constructive impact.

To start, HMG needs to think strategically about how it engages. Some of the smaller Nigerian states are larger than entire countries where HMG is currently supporting SSR. Even with an increased budget, the UK and other donors will not be able substantially to increase the capacity of the government to deliver security services. Because political will for change is limited, UK engagement needs to focus on understanding and seeking to influence, where appropriate, the political drivers of reform.

A strategy for strengthening security provision in Nigeria must be rooted in the specific experiences of the country. There are competing sources of security decision-making authority in Nigeria, at the federal, state and local levels. The relationship between government and non-governmental security institutions often appears dysfunctional, but as the case of the Niger Delta suggests, there are frequent instances of central government accommodating – if not cooperating with – non-governmental security providers.

Developing an SSR engagement that will work in the Nigerian context needs to be based, first of all, on understanding and solving a particular problem rather than replicating Western institutions. The security challenges which need to be solved are likely to differ dramatically from state to state, ranging from armed robbery to communal/religious strife. Different strategies may be required, which do not focus simply on delivering reform along preconceived lines.

Identifying possible actions, testing which ones work, and monitoring these will all require a more substantive investment in political analysis by HMG actors working in-country. For a start, this will involve carefully testing assumptions about the level of political will for reform, and the institutional capacity to effect change. It will also require coming to terms with the formal/informal dualism which characterizes security provision in Nigeria.

Research should not just be an *introduction* to an SSR programme, but rather a component of it. This will allow for a more flexible approach to programming so that adjustments can be made in response to changes in the political environment. ∎

Section 4
Sri Lanka policy note[5]

Current political context

Over the course of the study on the 'politics of security decision-making', the political situation in Sri Lanka has steadily deteriorated. Although the 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) effectively broke down two or three years ago, there was no return to full hostilities between the government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) until late 2007. This escalation in violence is significant because it confirms a turning point in the government's approach to dealing with the military conflict and the Tamil problem. Under the ceasefire, the search for a political solution to the Tamil problem and the search for a solution to the military conflict were one and the same. Under continued and extensive international pressure, the government was at least willing to leave the door open to eventual negotiations with the LTTE.

However, the situation appears to have changed. In the face of pressure from Sinhalese nationalists, government policy is now to separate military action against the LTTE from the search for a political solution to the Tamil problem. The government's attempt at finding a political solution has three elements: establishment of the All Party Reform Committee (APRC), full implementation of the 13th Amendment which devolved power to the Provincial Councils, and trying to shore up Tamil political groups opposed to the LTTE.

The return to war has also marked a shift in the attitude of some members of the international community. While some still believe that negotiation is possible, others are more sceptical. A number of countries including the United States and the UK have proscribed the LTTE. The Sri Lankan state is also receiving various forms of international support in its military operations against the LTTE, including intelligence. This suggests that the Sri Lankan conflict is now becoming a bigger issue for some countries, and related to stability and maritime security in South Asia and the US-led War on Terrorism. This change in international approach in the face of escalating conflict is likely to restrict the space for SSR.

Donors have generally remained patient as the political situation has deteriorated, maintaining pressure on the Sri Lankan government to protect human rights and respect international humanitarian law. However, a number – including the Dutch and the Swedes – now appear to be reducing their level of engagement. With a return to war, there will be a need for HMG to reassess its Peace-Building Strategy (PBS), of which SSR is a key component.

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5   The analysis for this policy note draws on *The Politics of Security Decision-making: Sri Lanka Country Study* by Jayadeva Uyangoda and Sunil Bastian (June 2008).

Status of HMG SSR programme

Current HMG engagement in the security sector, which is led by DFID and the High Commission with the support of the SSDAT, consists of a number of projects to strengthen the strategic planning capacity of the police, the higher-level defence management and national security policy development. These programmes were reinitiated in 2006 following a period of consultation with the government, which agreed to commit resources to the programme. Of the three areas of reform, security policy development is seen as the top priority for change. The aim is to provide the president with national security policy options from a wider range of sources, rather than just a defence-centric application of force, and to assist policy-makers in analysis and planning.

It was believed that UK assistance in all three areas, if delivered in a developmental manner, would fit within and support the key objectives of the PBS. These include working to secure a commitment to a negotiated peace in Sri Lanka, to improve safety and security within communities, and to improve civilian oversight and accountability within the security services.

With the return to war, these SSR objectives remain as valid as ever, though a review will be required to determine whether they are still consistent with any changes eventually made to the PBS. Furthermore, HMG will also need to determine how the government's recent shift to an active war-footing will affect its ability to deliver assistance effectively at both the strategic and the programmatic level, and to reassess and militate against any associated risks.

Key research findings

The context in which the security decision-making study was conducted in 2006–07 is very different to today. As a consequence, the research team did not anticipate some key issues today confronting HMG policy-makers, in particular relating to the government's current policy of seeking a military solution to the conflict and any implications this may have for the UK programme of SSR assistance. Nevertheless, the Sri Lanka study offers a number of important lessons concerning dimensions of security decision-making in a society confronted with a protracted ethno-political civil war.

External actors seeking to influence Sri Lanka's security policies need to be aware that external engagement in the security sector appears to operate on two contradictory paths. In some ways this is repetition of past history. The first path relates to efforts made by international actors since the breakdown of the 2002 ceasefire in an attempt to dissuade both the government and the LTTE from returning to full-scale war. International actors, both state and non-state, have been expressing serious concern about a possible deterioration in the overall security situation and its potential humanitarian consequences for the civilian populations of Northern and Eastern Provinces. These concerns have contributed to global and domestic debates about the future of Sri Lanka's war and peace, though the external pressure has not been successful in preventing an escalation.

The war led to the eviction of the LTTE from Eastern Province in mid-2007, with the large-scale displacement of civilians, and reports of grave human rights violations and humanitarian crisis. The Sri Lankan government successfully managed external pressure on these issues through a combination of tactics that included: disregarding international expressions of disapproval, denying that there were violations of human rights and a growing humanitarian problem, and appealing to the 'national sovereignty' argument.

Meanwhile, Sri Lanka has continued to receive assistance on the economic and development fronts. There is continued support for mainstream development activities, for instance special trade agreements to support the economy, support for private sector development, etc. The Sri Lankan government has also successfully exploited the global conditions available under the US-led War on Terror in its ongoing military campaign against the LTTE. Linking its own war against the LTTE to the broader global war against terrorism, has rendered less effective international pressure exerted on the government to de-escalate and to respect humanitarian and human rights concerns. Meanwhile, in its own military decision-making, the LTTE has also disregarded international pressure.

Therefore, a key prerequisite for current policy engagement with the Sri Lankan government is the development of a coordinated approach among donors and harmonization of aid policies. As mentioned in the DAC guidelines on aid in conflict situations, this should include 'the need for improved and shared analysis of conflict situations as a precursor to developing joint approaches to conflict situations in particular countries and regions'.[6] It is important to recognize what such coordination would actually entail. Effective and robust donor coordination needs to be based on a shared analysis which presupposes a shared political position. Such donor co-ordination was visible during the 2002 peace process. But it has almost disappeared in post-peace process conditions. Donors now seem to be back to pursuing their own individual priorities, whether that is to provide support for the government's economic agenda in spite of the conflict, as happened in the 1990s, promoting traditional projects, or simply maintaining a presence in order to satisfy their institutional agendas.[7]

The policy reforms required to make the security sector more responsive to the security needs of all the citizens will be difficult, though crucially necessary, as long as the war between the state and the LTTE continues. The first reason is that the government views any project of making the security apparatus responsive to human rights and human security as weakening the state's military capacity. The second is that the LTTE, which has an alternative security apparatus, continues to remain unaccountable in terms of its own security policies and practices. There is hardly any mechanism to make the LTTE responsive to the rule of law in conditions of war. Thirdly, current arguments for making the security sector more responsive to people's genuine security needs emanate primarily from local civil society and external actors. However, the present Sri Lankan government views such inputs on security policy as undue interference in the mandate of government.

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6   'Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners and DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation', OECD (2001), Paris, http://www.oecd.org/DAC.

7   For a more comprehensive analysis of these issues, see Bastian, S., 2007. *The Politics of Foreign Aid in Sri Lanka: Promoting Markets and Supporting Peace*. International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo.

The best space for constructive reforms in security policies, institutions and practices is created by conditions of ceasefire, negotiations and conflict de-escalation. In view of the fact that Sri Lanka's conflict is a protracted one, interventions for policy reforms in the security sector are likely to be more successful if delayed until conditions are ripe for an overall re-articulation of the security problem.

This creates a major policy dilemma, given the recurrent problem in Sri Lanka of impunity in the face of human rights violations. The commitment of the government and the LTTE to reducing impunity is not robust. The government has stubbornly resisted even admitting that impunity is a problem. One way to address this dilemma is for external actors to continue high-level dialogue with the government, despite its seeming stubbornness concerning external inputs into security policy. Punitive measures on both the government and the LTTE in terms of conditionality might or might not work. In conflicts where nationalist sentiments are regularly summoned to justify unacceptable state action, punitive policies even for good causes have a tendency to be counter-productive.

External interventions in the security sector therefore run the risk of complicating the security situation. There is at present a heightened level of nationalist politics in Sri Lanka. It has given rise to a politics of xenophobia and inward-looking patriotism. Nationalist groups are influential in the government policy arena, in the media and in public debates on issues particularly relating to ethnic conflict, political reforms, peace negotiations and national security. External sources of policy influence, particularly in the security domain, are usually seen by them as threats to national sovereignty.

In its ongoing attempts to reconfigure the country's foreign relations with a new emphasis on the Asian powers, the government may feel more confident in its ability to resist Western pressure for liberal governance.

Implications for HMG policy

In light of current government resistance to a negotiated solution, HMG policy-makers should recognize that SSR is only one element of broader security changes needed in Sri Lanka. There are unlikely to be significant reforms within the security sector consistent with the original objectives of the UK programme of assistance while the conflict with the LTTE continues. Other countries such as South Africa which have undertaken SSR with some degree of success, have done so in a context of political transformations. This has made it possible for South Africa to address the structural problems in the state which gave rise to its conflicts in the first place.

The resolution of Sri Lanka's conflict will likely require similar transformations, including in the oversight, structure and functioning of its security sector. The current culture of impunity in the security sector, for instance, has its origins in the enactment of laws and emergency legislation that have dramatically increased the autonomy of the security forces over the past twenty years. Continued support for SSR should therefore be based on a careful assessment of the political space available to address weaknesses in the overall institutional and political framework for civil oversight of the security forces.

This may require a broader strategy of engagement than the current focus on providing assistance primarily through security sector institutions. Such a strategy would seek to incorporate SSR aims and concerns into wider economic and social development programming, where applicable. For instance, there may be scope for leverage in the way that donors negotiate their programmes of assistance, particularly when they are financial in nature, in order to increase the engagement of other government institutions such as the Ministry of Finance in security questions.

Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the UK's current emphasis on trying to establish a security sector that is more professional and that operates within internationally-accepted norms may be undermined by the policies of other donors who are more concerned with the global War on Terrorism. This rendered ineffective international pressure on the government for de-escalation as well as to respect international humanitarian law and human rights. Achieving a coherent external position on the questions of SSR and how to address the wider conflict should therefore be seen as a desirable condition if HMG policy initiatives in the security sector are to achieve their intended outcome.

One key area will be the issue of impunity. Government attempts to shield itself by deploying the arguments of national sovereignty should not deter international actors from raising the question of impunity on a regular basis in its consultations with the government, as well as in international forums. At the same time, given the government's tendency to ignore external criticism on this front, there may be a case to adopt a different, or complementary, strategy which involves raising the issue of impunity in the context of the effectiveness of the overall military solution currently being pursued. The idea that the government might win the battle militarily but never win the war due to public resentment at widespread human rights abuses is one which has not received much attention.

Finally, external actors need to keep in mind the role of non-state armed actors as a source of community insecurity. In the current context their actions have been responsible for insecurity as much as the actions of the state. In order to meet the threat to community security from these non-state actors, external actors will need a separate set of strategies.

Since all external interventions are bound to be political, the UK must maintain and develop the capacity for sound political judgement on the changing situation in the security sector. This is essential not only to ensure that HMG's assistance policies are well-grounded in political realities, but also to convey to the government that HMG understands the dilemmas it faces in pushing forward a reform agenda in a context of armed conflict. In this context, any suggestion by external actors that SSR is necessary is likely to be viewed with suspicion because it will be interpreted as undermining state capacity to fight the separatist threat.

Far from making SSR irrelevant, the recent escalation in the war underscores its necessity, in particular the need for a strong synergy between the developmental, conflict and security components of HMG's Peace-Building Strategy. ■

Section 5
Uganda policy note[8]

Current political context

Under the National Resistance Movement (NRM), Uganda has made significant progress on many fronts since 1986 in addressing the diverse security threats which face its population. With increased political stability and security have come, in turn, enhanced prospects for human development. This has led to a significant decrease in poverty levels among Ugandans, though these benefits have not been evenly spread across the population.

Many Ugandans remain marginalized from the development process and continue to suffer the effects of conflict and insecurity. These problems are most prevalent in northern Uganda which has been gripped by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency since the late 1980s. The war in the north has resulted in massive displacement and suffering among the local population which continues today despite recent progress on the peace front. The Karamojong and neighbouring populations continue to experience the debilitating effects of intra-regional and cross-border cattle raiding as well as small arms proliferation. Certain populations living in the west are still vulnerable to armed conflict which spills over the border from the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). More generally, the government continues to face challenges in ensuring the safety of populations, in both rural and urban areas, given weaknesses in its public security system.

There is an opportunity now to rethink HMG's (and the wider donor community's) approach to security in Uganda, which until recently has been narrowly focused on defence (and defence spending in particular). If a peace settlement is eventually signed between the government and the LRA, this will open the way to broader rehabilitation efforts in the north that (should ideally) cut across the economic, social and security domain. It is important that ways are sought to broaden the current defence engagement into an SSR programme and, where possible, that this is effectively linked to wider economic and social development programming.

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8   The analysis for this policy note draws on *The Politics of Security Decision-making: Uganda Country Study* by Sabiiti Mutengesa and Dylan Hendrickson (June 2008).

Status of HMG SSR programme

Since the early 1990s, the NRM government has received international assistance of various forms to strengthen its capacity in the security domain. Initially, the primary orientation of this assistance was to reduce the size of the army and military spending, and increase the operational capability of the police and army. Starting in the late 1990s, the government and its development partners took a number of important steps to address security problems in a more strategic manner by complementing operational reforms with various initiatives to strength management and strategic planning within the security sector.

Among the most notable initiatives have been the Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS) reform programme, now in its second phase; a comprehensive Defence Review, currently in its implementation phase; support to the Amnesty Commission, provided through the World Bank-supported Multi-Donor Reintegration Programme (MDRP), which has helped with the reinsertion of ex-rebels from both the LRA and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF); and various initiatives being led by the National Focal Point on Small Arms to address the proliferations of light weapons.

While each of these initiatives are important, they have not been sufficiently integrated with each other or wider government policy processes designed to address the causes of insecurity. Strategic planning and coordination in the security domain presents a major challenge for the government given the diverse security threats facing Uganda, the large number of Ugandan and external actors engaged, and the multiplicity of policy frameworks within which they work. This has resulted in differing, conflicting or uncoordinated approaches to addressing security problems, which has undermined the overall effectiveness of government and donor policy interventions.

The UK's programme of support for the Uganda Defence Review came to an end in October 2005. Following the presidential election in February 2006, the government made a request to the UK for assistance to implement the Defence Review's findings. Government identified fourteen areas that were prioritized within the Corporate Plan. After a period of consultation between DFID, the SSDAT and the Ministry of Defence, five areas were selected where it was felt there could be a beneficial impact on performance, governance and civil–military relations.

In addition, following a process of consultation between DFID, Uganda and relevant stakeholders across the security sector and donor community, DFID has drafted a proposal for a broader strategy of engagement in the security sector. In addition to the proposed work on defence, other areas of work under consideration include support for the parliamentary defence and security committee, development of the government's Security Policy Framework, civil society engagement in security issues, and security-related research initiatives in the academic and policy community.

Key research findings

Uganda offers a number of important lessons about security decision-making in an aid-dependent country afflicted by long-standing insecurity. External actors need to be aware,

first of all, about the potentially contradictory impact of external assistance on efforts to develop more responsive state security institutions. On the one hand, aid can serve to enhance the capacity of government to solicit the views of its populace on key areas of policy. On the other, it can serve as a disincentive for the development of the very kinds of institutions it seeks to foster, by fundamentally altering the relationship between political elites and the citizenry in ways which are not consistent with enhancing accountability. Uganda's aid-dependence eliminates the need for political elites to make a fiscal contract with the citizenry and thus fundamentally undermines the foundation of democratic accountability and responsiveness.

A second prerequisite for engaging in the security domain is to understand how socio-economic underdevelopment as well as the inherent character of the NRMO, coupled with the make-up of the population, constrain the space for constituencies seeking to promote more responsive state policies in the security domain. The amount of information available to the general population is limited, as are the incentives – in the face of more pressing live-lihood concerns – to prioritize change in the way that security policy is managed. Within the non-governmental and academic domain, there is a limited pool of people who are conversant in security issues and can advocate a coherent and independent vision of reform. Similarly, opposition parties have not shown themselves to be capable of moving beyond a policy of denouncing government to defining viable alternatives to current structures for the proper management of security policy.

Where pressure for change within the security domain (along the lines favoured by donors) has been exerted most strongly, it has been budget-driven (with strong donor pressure, backed by conditionality, following a donor-inspired reform plan). In this case, however, there has been a contradiction between pressures to reform the security forces and the desire of political elites (led by the president) to maintain independent control over security policy. As a consequence, the government has developed the capacity to effectively 'absorb' externally-derived pressure for reform by playing along with externally-supported initiatives, as the Defence Review illustrates.

While donors have achieved some success through the PEAP in terms of opening up the policy space for civil society and redirecting resources to the local level and the social sectors, the PEAP has had limited influence in sensitive domains like security. The same could be said of other donor initiatives in the security domain which have largely been technical in orientation, though in the last five years approaches have broadened with both the JLOS programme and the Defence Review. These initiatives have raised the profile of SSR within government circles, primarily, though they have made limited headway thus far in opening up security policy processes to broader public debate and integrating them into government-wide planning and budgeting processes.

Even as donors have pushed for reform within the security domain since the late 1990s, there has been a countervailing push by the president to shore up the position of the security services and ensure their loyalty. Under the NRMO the military remains a dominant instrument for resolving political disputes. In many ways this is understandable, given Uganda's turbulent history and the security problems that continue to plague the country. The build-

ing of a strong army has resulted in an unprecedented period of political stability in post-independence Uganda, though this has come at the cost of rising defence spending, a centralization of decision-making authority and an increasing reluctance by the president to tolerate donor interference in the security domain.

Implications for HMG policy

The above analysis suggests that while there may be a role for external assistance to support and complement national reform initiatives, the former cannot substitute for an internally-driven process of change. This has various implications for how HMG engages in Uganda with a view to enhancing state responsiveness in the security domain.

The first is to adopt a *cautious and reflective* approach. The issue is not so much about *whether* to engage – for the donor community is by virtue of its close relationship with the current government and the high levels of aid provision intricately tied in (even if indirectly) to security policy processes – but rather *how.* It is not justifiable for a donor to say that because they provide little or no assistance to security activities, they have little impact on policy within that domain. Experience suggests that aid in general, even if targeted at the social sectors, facilitates security policy in certain ways by freeing up government resources which might otherwise be allocated to development expenditure.

What follows then is a requirement for HMG to adopt a strategic and informed approach to providing development assistance, with particular sensitivity to how aid is incorporated into or otherwise affects security policy processes. In light of this, careful analysis of dynamics that are likely to affect reform processes needs to underpin any engagement in the security domain.

There are three different levels where this analysis could be of use: first, in terms of understanding the historical and structural factors that have affected the evolution of the country's security institutions, including the legacies of colonialism. This is key to understanding *current* institutional and political trajectories which will determine how much change is possible, and what kind of change is actually desirable in the circumstances. This should also lead HMG to be cautious when it comes to making assumptions about the 'political will' to carry out reforms. Achieving desired policy aims that enhance public security is dependent not only on the inclination of decision-makers to make the 'right' choices, but also on adequate capacity within the system to implement decisions *and* a public that can effectively press home their policy preferences.

The second priority area for analysis relates to contemporary security institutions and the configuration of political power in the security domain. There is a need to understand the political drivers of change, first and foremost, before deciding how to target assistance. This is key to understanding where power really lies, who HMG should be speaking to and seeking to influence. This is particularly important in Uganda, in part due to the formal/informal dualism which underpins institutions in both the security sector and the state more generally. A good example of this can be seen with regard to the fluid relationships between regular security forces such as the Uganda Peoples Defence Force and Uganda Police Force

and the array of militias and other non-statutory security forces that play a prominent role in Uganda's security sector. On the other hand, the structural link between the ruling party and the security forces, which goes back to the days of the liberation war, may mean that fundamental defence reforms are unlikely while the current crop of Movement leaders are still in power.

The third priority – as noted above – is the whole area of aid-security dynamics, in particular understanding how aid-dependency and donor–government relations affect the incentives for reform in the security domain. The kinds of changes HMG (and many Ugandans) would like to see in the security domain are unlikely to emerge from technical consultations. In a sensitive domain like security, the PEAP is not a sufficient instrument for addressing the deep issues of social and political change within Uganda that are necessary for enhancing state responsiveness to insecurity. This underscores the importance of political dialogue to complement technical SSR initiatives as well as coherence among donors who at times work at cross-purposes.

But more fundamentally, it suggests the need to acknowledge the limitations of a state-centric SSR strategy in the absence of complementary initiatives to strengthen internal 'demand' for security. The level of internal demand for change should be a determining factor in the nature, orientation and level of HMG engagement in Uganda's security domain.

The above suggests that an analysis of power and process in security policy-making can improve external interventions in Uganda's security sector. To achieve this, however, HMG may need to invest in greater in-country administrative capacity in order to manage SSR engagements in an effective, sensitive and politically-informed manner. This requires staff with appropriate local knowledge, skills, and incentives to engage with the non-administrative aspects of programme management including political analysis, policy development and relationship-building. Outsourcing of SSR to consultants can carry risks if it results in divorce between the technical and political dimensions of an assistance programme, and should primarily be seen as an instrument to enhance rather than to substitute for a coherent cross-departmental engagement.

A dynamic and continuing analysis of the factors that will affect SSR in Uganda should underpin all stages of HMG's proposed programme and, as much as possible, draw on relevant local knowledge provided by Uganda's fledgling security research community. A final decision on whether DFID should take forward work in these areas will depend on agreement with the government on an SSR programme and positive signals that it is committed to taking forward the Defence Review recommendations. ■

Micro-case studies

Nigeria

- Irregular forces and security in the Niger Delta (Fidelis Allen, University of Port Harcourt)
- O'odua Peoples Congress and vigilante activities in Lagos State (Abubakar Momoh, Lagos State University)
- The political economy of public security decision-making: the case of the Bakassi Boys of Abia State (Nwaorgu Omenihu C., University of Port Harcourt)
- The politics of security decision-making: MPRI case study (Julie G. Sanda, National War College, Abuja)
- The politics of security decision-making: the case of the Hisbah in Kano State (Y. Z. Ya'u, Centre for Information Technology and Development, Kano)

Sri Lanka

- Responsiveness for defence: security decision-making for peace-making (Austin Fernando, Independent researcher)
- Security concerns of the Muslim community in Sri Lanka (Farzana Haniffa, Law and Society Trust, Colombo)
- Sri Lanka Defence Forces: a case study of decision-making processes and the defence reform initiative of 2002 (Sundari Jayasuriya, Aus-Aid)
- The role of disappearance commissions as a mechanism to provide redress for human rights abuses (Amal Jayawardane, University of Colombo)
- The Prevention of Terrorism Act of Sri Lanka: security decisions as a cause of insecurity (S.I. Keethaponcalan, University of Colombo)
- Security policy-making in Sri Lanka: a case study of government actions and non-actions, May–August 1983 (Jagath P. Senaratne, Independent researcher)

Uganda

- Carrot and stick: the oscillating security policy positions on the Northern Conflict in Uganda (Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Makerere University, and John Ssenkumba, Centre for Basic Research)
- Donor influence on security decision-making in Uganda: insights from the defence budgeting process, 2002-05 (Dylan Hendrickson, CSDG, King's College London)

- The politics of security decision-making in Uganda: an analysis of the dynamics of forceful disarmament in Karamoja (Frank Muhereza, Centre for Basic Research)
- The politics of security decision-making in Uganda: the case of the Arrow Boys militia in Teso Region, eastern Uganda (Abbas Wetaaka Wadala, Marcus Garvey Pan-Afrikan Institute, Islamic University, Mbale)
- Decision-making in the provision of public security in an urban setting: the case of Operation Wembley and the Violent Crime Crack Unit (VCCU) in Kampala, Uganda (John Ssenkumba, Centre for Basic Research)

Country studies

- Nigeria country study (Okechukwu Ibeanu, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, and Abubakar Momoh, Lagos State University)
- Sri Lanka country study (Jayadeva Uyangoda, Social Scientists' Association, and Sunil Bastian, International Center for Ethnic Studies)
- Uganda country study (Sabiiti Mutengesa and Dylan Hendrickson, both CSDG, King's College London)

Policy papers

- State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: the Politics of Security Decision-making: *Synthesis of Findings and Implications for UK SSR Policy* (Dylan Hendrickson)
- State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: the Politics of Security Decision-making: *Review of Methodology and Lessons for Future Research* (Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson)
- State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: the Politics of Security Decision-making – A Comparative Study of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda: *HMG SSR Policy Briefing* (edited by Dylan Hendrickson)

Electronic copies of the country studies and the policy papers can be down-loaded from http://www.ssrnetwork.net/publications/psdm.php

The **Centre for Basic Research** (CBR) is a research and training organization based in Kampala. Established in 1988, CBR is a centre of excellence on sustainable development issues. CBR conducts basic and applied research of social, economic and political significance to Uganda in particular and Africa in general, so as to influence policy, raise consciousness and improve quality of life.

www.cbr-ug.org/

The **Centre for Democracy and Development** (CDD) is an independent, not-for-profit, research, training and advocacy organization based in Abuja, Nigeria. Its primary mission *is to be a catalyst and facilitator for strategic analysis and capacity building for sustainable democracy and development in the West African sub-region.* Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim, who managed the Nigeria research, is Director.

www.cddwestafrica.org/

The **Social Scientists' Association** (SSA) is a leading civil society institution in Sri Lanka committed to the production and dissemination of critical knowledge in the areas of political economy, gender, social and political change, conflict and peace processes. The SSA is also engaged in community education and advocacy. SSA publishes *Polity*, a monthly journal on current critical issues concerning Sri Lanka.

www.ssalanka.org/

The **Conflict, Security and Development Group** (CSDG) is a leading international resource for research, analysis, training and expert policy advice on issues at the intersection of security and development. CSDG was established at King's College London in 1999 with the aim of bridging the academic and policy communities. Its core mandate is to deepen understanding about the development challenges confronting societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and to help translate this knowledge into practical agendas for change at local, national, regional and international levels.

www.securityanddevelopment.org/